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REED v. TIAvwARD [2:J C.2d 
48 Ca1.App.2d 157 [119 P.2d 387]; Sanguinetti v. Sangui-
netti, 9 Ca1.2d 95 [69 P.2d 845, III A.L.R. 342J.) 
Upon the premise that Dickinson died intestate and de-
fendant Hayward is an heir, the latter's interest in the de-
cedent's real property may be impressed 'with a lien to secure 
the performance of her obligatioIt to support plaintiff even 
though the estate is still in the process of administration, sub-
ject, of course, to administration of the estate. That propo-
sition follows from the rules that title to the property of the 
estate passes to the heir upon the death of the intestate (Prob. 
Code, sec. 300); that pending administration an heir may 
conveyor encumber his interest in the estate (UB Ca1.Jur. 
827-829) ; that the heir's interest in personal property is sub-
ject to attachment and execution liens under appropriate re-
strictions (Code Civ. Proc., secs. 561, 688; Estate of Lind, 
1 CaUd 291 [34 P.2d 486]), a~d the same applies to real 
property (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 542, subd. 2; Noble v. Beach, 
supra); and that a judgment lien attaches to the heir's in-
terest pending probate (McGee v. Allen, 7 Cal.2d 468 [60 
P.2d 1026J; Noble v. Beach, supra). Under the foregoing 
rules there is no interference with the jurisdiction of the 
probate court or the lawful and orderly administration of the 
estate, inasmuch as any lien imposed is subject to the admin-
istration of the estate and all the rights pertinent thereto. 
Hence, there is no valid reason why a lien may not be imposed. 
upon the interest of defendant Hayward as an heir of Dick-inson. 
[9) Both Counts of the complaint aUege that defendants 
ely and Durkee, respondents here, claim an interest in the 
property described therein, but that such claim is without 
right. Certainly in an action to quiet title and to establish 
a lien on real property, plaintiff may join as defendant anyone 
asserting an interest in the property in order that a complete 
determination of the controversy may be had, and the priori-
ties of rights established. (See Code Civ. Proc., secs. 379, 
380; Murray v. Murray, 115 Cal. 266 [47 P. 37, 56 Am.St. Rep. 97, 37 L.R.A. 626J.) 
For the foregoing re!lsons the judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Tray_ 
nor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
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No. 16832. In Bank.,D~~:)1,)943~L, :.' <i' 
[So F. A llant v BOARIi 'OFJ;O!'lTIW~ 
GEORGE BAUlCH, ppe LIFORNIA 'et al.'rl~e~p,oll~e~,' 
.' OF THE STATE OF CA .,' ,,-'1.1 ""' ... " '" 
n! fuI Taklng.;....:Action for [1] Eminent Domain-Remedies fOrt'~n ;:., inverse condemnation 
Damages-Pleading.-In an ac lonstruction of the San,Fran-
for damages resulting from th: :f the State Board of <?,ontrol 
cisco Bay Bridge, t~e ~em~:: it had nothing to do 'W1~~ t!~ 
was properly sustau;e Went or the 'alleged dam~~ 
construction of the Im~rovem interested only as the reCIpIent plaintiff's property, an was 
of plaintiff's claim for damages. ld Action for Damages-
Id -Remedies for Un!awfu~ Ta ~for depreciation in the 
[2] parlies.-In an action for tha~~~:truction of the approaches 
value of property caused h~ . de the failure to name the State 
to the San Francisco Ray ~ g:, t did not require .afllrmance 
of California as a part~ d~ entsa:n demurrer, where. the com-
of the judgment for de e\ an ts necessary to state a case 
plaint contained all the e:.:e~he state agencies. whic~ ~a~ 
against the State and:a f the improvement. Plamt~: 
charge of the construe ~o:t °te the State as a party sho 
request for leave to su s 1 u 
have been granted. Action for Damages-
S Id -Remedies for Unlawful Tak~ngi art 1 § 14, prohib-[ 1 O .... tI .. tI .... Self ....... tn.!;:.;.,. .ri.hou ............ 
iting the taking or. damagm~e~therconsent to sue .the Sta~e 
tion is self-executmg, and d by legislative amendment'18 
' h t'on of a reme y 
nor t e crea 1 • lief therellnder. . . 
necessary to obtam re . Taking-Action for Dam~ges-
[4] Id.-Remedies for Unlawful I Code. '§§ 667,688, relatmg to 
. Pol. Code, §§ 667, 688.-Po. t ~n' obstacle. to recovery of 
claims against the ~t~te, ~reth:ovalue ofpropertyc~used by 
damages for depreCIatIOn m h' to the Sam FranCISCO Bay the construction of the approac es 
Bridge. . . Cl i . s-Purpose of Statute. 
[5] State of California,;....Liabilitr 667~: to establish an orderly 
-The purpose of Pol. Code, § . I 't would be adviSed of 
procedure .by whic:ta~ein L;:-:a:c:e where no provision had claims agamst the t 
' been made for their paymen . . ... § 194' [7] Emi-
[1 4] Eminent Domam, , 11 12] McK. Dig. References: - t t of California, § 60; [8, '. 
nimt Domain, § 43(1); ~5, ~] StaLe § 97' [10] Eminent Domam, 
:t § 32' [9] ConstItutIon a aw, " . Stree s" . § 45 
§ 51; [13] Eminent Domam, • . . 
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[6] Id. Liability Claim I of .a claim in invers:- nverse ~ondemnation.-In the case 
stitution, Pol. Code § ~~~de~natIOn predi~ated on the Con-
claim with the Bo~d of' Co~:: fot reqUIre ,t~e filing of a 
to an action thereon nor act 0 ~~ ~ c~ndltIon precedent 
within which an action m t bas a ImItatIOn upon the time 
. us e commenced. 
[7] EmInent Domain-Oompens t' anty.-In an action for d a lon-State Oonstitutional Guar-
of property caused by th~magest for ,depreciation in the value 
the San Francisco Ba B:i~ns ruction o~ t~e approaches to 
compensation under t: fe, the plamtIff is entitled to 
his property has been :ak:~r o~n~ of Codnsft., art. I" § 14, if 
[8] S' amage or a pubhc use treets-Rlghts of Abutter-E . 
erty abutting upon a public str:::~:ts,-An owne:r of ,Prop-
nature of an easement in th t a,property rlght m the 
h' b t . e s reet WhICh IS app t ,IS a, u tmg property and which i h' , ,ur enant to 
tmgUIshed from his right as s b IS pnvate right, as dis-
[ a mem er of the public 9] Oonstitutional Law-Police Po' . 
an action for damages for de r:~r-:-Rl~ht to Damages.-In 
erty caused by the constructi~n ot;~on In the value .of prop-
Francisco Bay Bridge wh 't' e approaches to the San 
the lowering of the interse:;: 1 IS alleged that because of 
street on which the plaintiff' g street below the level of the i~tersecting street has been :o~:operty abuts, his access to the 
dlcular flight of stairs where th excep~ ~or an almost perpen-
construction of a pubiic ' e condItion resulted from the 
appear that any compelli~mgPerovement, and where it does not 
'd h mergency or public . 
<l,ulre suc construction without the necessIty re-
tIOn for property damage th St t payment of compensa-
ment of compensation udder e th a e If!1ay not escape the pay-
[10] E ' e po Ice power. 
mment Domain-Property for Wh' be Demanded-Easements _ Wh th lch Oompensation may 
by the construction of a . u ' e. er or not the impairment 
owner's right of access fo b!lC :mp~o~ement, of an abuttin~ 
which his property abut' s ree mtersecting that upon 
th h s IS compensable is d d e c aracter and extent of th epen ent upon 
[ e owner's easement f 
. 11] Streets-Ri,ghts of Abutte E 0 access. 
t t f r- asements-Acc T en 0 the easement of a ess.- he ex-
is reasonably required giC::s ma~:be 8a~d to be that which 
poses to .which the pr~perty fs :~:;!e;.atlon to all. the pur-
[12] Id.-Rights of Abutter-E . asements-Access. The right of 
[8] Right of abutting owner to co ' 
cul-de-sac, note, 49 A.L.R. 351. 93 mpensatlOn for creation of 
Jur. 333; 18 Am.Jur. 813; 25 Am.J::~~ 642. See, also, 10 Oal. 
Dec. 1943] BACICH V. BOARD OF CONTROL [23 C,2d343] 
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access extends in both directions to the next intersecting 
street. 
[13] Eminent Domain-Compensation-What Constitutes Dam-
aging.-In an action for damages for depreciation in the 
value of property caused by the construction of the ap-
proaches to the San Francisco Bay Bridge, the plaintiff may 
not claim compensation because all the residences except his 
own, in a dElscribed area· in which his property is situated, 
were eliminated by defendants and a street railway formerly 
operating on the abutting street was removed. . 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. E. P. Shortall, Judge. 
Reversed with directions. 
Action for damages for depreciation in value of property 
caused by bridge approaches. Judgment for defendants re-
versed with directions. 
Hubbard & Hubbard, John J. Batistich and J. C. Miller 
for Appellant. 
u. S. Webb, Attorney General, Earl Warren, Attorney Gen-
eral, Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, John J. Dailey, Dep-
uty Attorney General, C, C. Carleton, Robert E. Reed, F. M. 
McAuliffe, Albert M. Monaco and Heller, Ehrman, White & 
McAuliffe for Respondents. 
CARTER, J .-The demurrers of defendants Board of Con-
trol, California Toll-Bridge Authority and State Department 
of Public Works to plaintiff's complaint for damages in this 
action in inverse condemnation were sUstained without leave 
to amend. Plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of an improved lot . 
situated on the west side of Sterling Street between the 
intersection of that street with Bryant Street· and Harrison 
Street in the City and County of San Francisco, the two 
latter streets being parallel j that before the construction of 
the improvement hereinafter mentioned Harrison Street waS 
level with Sterling Street and he had access from his lot to 
Harrison Street by footpaths and street railway; that a street 
railway extending along Sterling Street served his property j 
that the area around his property was formerly used for 
residential purposes; that the construction of the approaches 
346 
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to the San Francisco Bay Bridge by defendants resulted in 
the lowering of Harrison Street fifty feet, leaving as the 
only access thereto an almost perpendicular flight of steps, 
the destruction of the residence property in the area, the 
removal of the street railway, and the erection of an elevated 
highway between his lot and Bryant Street which he must 
pass under to reach the latter street; that by reason of. the 
foregoing his property has been damaged in the SUm of $14,-
000; and that he filed a claim for those damages with de. 
fendant Board of Control which was rejected. 
[1] The demurrer of defendant State Board of Control was 
properly sustained inasmuch as it had nothing to do with 
the construction of the improvement or the alleged damag-
ing of plaintiff's property. It is not charged that the Board 
of Control, a state agency, had anything to do with the con-
struction of the improvement, it being interested only as the 
recipient of the claim for damages filed by plaintiff. 
[2] The failure to name the State of California as a party 
defendant does not require an affirmance of the judgment. 
The complaint contains all the elements necessary to state a 
case against the State and has named the state agencies in 
their capacity as such which had charge of the construction 
of the improvement. The action is in effect one against the 
State. Plaintiff's request for leave to substitute the State as 
party defendant in place of the defendants Board of Control, 
California Toll-Bridge Authority, and Department of Public 
Works should have been granted. (Oalifornia Securities 00. 
v. State, 111 Cal.App. 258 [295 P. 583J.J Under those cir-
cumstances it is not necessary to consider whether the Toll-
Bridge Authority under its statutory powers had authority 
to do anything with reference to the construction of the im-
provement which plaintiff alleges caused the damages. 
[3] The instant action is predicated Upon the constitu_ 
tional provision that private property may not be taken or 
damaged for a pUblic purpose without the payment of jUst 
compensation. (Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 14.) That clause of 
the Constitution is self-executing and hence neither consent 
to SUe the State nOr the creation of a remedy by legislative 
enactment is necessary to obtain relief thereunder (Rose v. 
State of Oalifornia, 19 Ca1.2d 713 [123 P.2d 505]). 
[4] Sections 667 and 688 of the Political Code relating to 
claims against the State do not constitute an obstacle to re-
covery on the liability here involved. Section 688 by its terms 
Dec. 1943] BACICH V. BOARD OF CONTROL 
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. on "express contract or for 
applies only to clat~ ~as:dinvolved is one based upon th,e 
negligence." The calm er State exercises its ,power of 
liability incurred when the . the customary procedure 
eminent domain without pursUlng f action is in inverse ,eon-: 
h ase the cause 0 t t therefor. In sue a c d d ·th upon express con rae. d' ot foun e el er 
demnation an IS n tate of Oalifornia, supra.) . 
or negligence. (Rose~. S that. "Any person havmg a 
Section 667 states m part ttl ;nt of which is not other-
claim against the state, the se em t the lIame to the board 
wise provided for by law, mus~pres::ting of the legislature, 
at least four months before ; ~ the facts constituting 
accompanied ?y a .sta~ment s ~::n:r as complaints ,in ciyil 
the claim, verIfied m t e sa~e u on any such claim, notIce 
actions. Before finally passI~g p st be mailed to the claim-
of the time and place of he~rI~g ~: date set for final action. 
ant at least fifteen days prlO~ 0 dust proceed to examine 
At the time design~ted the ~ar he: evidence in support of 
and adjust such clamls. it~t :eYsanction of the governor, ;re-
or against them and, w h f ts and recommendatwns 
port to the legislature suc ac" (Emphasis added.) 
concerning them as may b? pr1~at section it is indicated [5] From the italicized portIObnl~ °h an orderly procedure by 
. as to esta IS " t the that ItS purp~se w uld be advised of claIms llgams 
which the Legislature wo . 'on had been made for 
. here no prOVISI . . State in mstances w . ld then be in a pOSItion Th LegIslature wou 
their payment. e . ht of the investigation and recom-
to determine, in the hg f C trol whether or not it should 
mendation of the. B?ard 0 o~e claim. That purpose is ~lso 
make an approprlatIOn to ~ay earin in the same article 
evidenced from other sectlO~ :fr~tion ~ection 664 embraces 
of the Politic~l Code. ~or to u the state controller where an 
the presentatIon of claIms S t' n 665 authorizes the con-
. . h been made ec 10 d 'f 
approprIatIOn as . claim he has approved, an 1 
trol1er to draw a warrant ~r a 'th his report with the Board 
disapproved to file it toge~ e\ WI laims where no appropri-
of Control. Section 666 mv~ ve~ ~s available for their pay-
ation has been made or no.;~ rovided by law, or where 
ment, the settlement of w~lcd ~:ch claims if approved by 
the fund has been ~x~a~ :e'transmitted to the Legislature. 
the Board of Contro sa. t' where no mode of settle-I 'th the sltua IOn . 11 Section 667 dea s Wl 'd d by the law. Essentla y, 
ment of the claim has been prOVl e 
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those sections deal with the means and methods of payment 
of claims, the conditions under which funds in the state 
treasury may be allocated to pay claims, and the obtaining 
of an appropriation from the Legislature when no funds are 
available. They are concerned with the mechanics of the 
financial operations of the State with relation to the payment 
of claims. In order to obtain payment of a claim from funds 
available therefor, or if not available from an appropriation 
by the Legislature, the requirements of those sections must 
be met. The requirement that claims be presented at least 
four months before the meeting of the Legislature is to give 
the Board of Control an opportunity to investigate them, 
thus enabling the ensuing Legislature to give them more in-
telligent consideration. The clear intent of the statute is that 
if a claim is to be given consideration at the next session of 
the Legislature it should be presented four months prior 
thereto and an investigation made. 
[6] Section 667 makes no provision for a flat rejection or 
approval of the claim by the board. It merely states that the 
board shall, with the sanction of the governor, report to the 
Legislature such facts and recommendations as may be proper. 
(See Sullivan v. Gage, 145 Cal. 759, 765 [79 P. 537], con-
Sidering similar requirements in the Political Code as then 
written.) No provision is made for the next steps available 
to the claimant if the recommendation is unfavorable. The 
section does not specify What session of the Legislature the 
four months' period must precede; that is, whether it is the 
session next following the accrual of the claim or some sub-
sequent session. If the claim accrued during the four months' 
period immediately preceding a session of the Legislature 
. . , 
certamly complIance could not be had with the section if the 
next ensuing session of the Legislature were meant. If the 
claim accrued four months and two days before the next ses-
sion of the Legislature, the claimant would have only two 
days in which to present his claim. That would be clearly 
unreasonable when we consider that his right is created and 
protected by the Constitution. A.lso as bearing upon the in-
tent of the Legislature it should be noted that in 1941 the 
Legislature added section 688.1 to the Political' Code (8tats. 
1941, ch. 982, p. 2618), where it for the :first time expressly 
provided that claims must be :filed with the board in cases of 
inverse condemnation and adopted section 688 for the re-
quirements in relation thereto. The act adding that section 
Dec. 1943] BACIcn v. BOARD OF CONTROL 
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.. licable to pending actions. At the 
expressly declared It map? t t'on was pending. All of f 'ts d tion the mstan ac 1 f 
time 0 1 a op 'f t the intent that in the case 0 
the foregoing factors mam es . dicated on the Consti-
a claim in inverse condemnatlO~4r:ection 667 does not re-
tution (Cal. Const., art .. I, se?t'h the Board of Control asa 
h fil' of a claIm WI l' 't fon quire t e mg t' thereon nor as a Iml a 1 
condition precedent to an .ahc IOn t'on ~ust be commenced. 
. 'thin whlC an ac 1 fil d b 
upon the time w~ nd timeliness of the claim e y 
Hence, the su~clency a tion is immaterial. 
plaintiff in the ~nst~nt ac t d in this case is whether or 
[7] The maJor Issue presen e tion under the constitu-
not plaintiff may recover competnsIa sec 14) in the light of 
.. (Cal Const ar.,. 'd th tional prOVISIOn . . H~ is entitled thereto un er e 
the facts stated by ~1~. 'f his roperty has been taken or 
wording of that pro:"lsIOn 1 The s~lution of that question de-
damaged for a publIc useh· t and extent of his property 1 I pon the c arac er . . d pends arge y u . ht nd it has been Impalre 
right. If he has a property r!ffhe :est frequently mentioned 
or damaged, he may recover.. 0 er if he has suffered a 
by the authorities, that he maYd rde~ffvrent in kind as differ-r to himself an 1 e , . damage pecu Iar h t ffered by the publIc gen-
entiated from deg~ee, fro~ \: :~lution of the problem. If 
erally, is of no assI~tance ~n't h:s been impaired, the damage 
he has a property right a:. 1 If and is different in kind from 
is necessarily pecul~ar to m~~:mber of the public or by the 
that suffered by hIm ~ a. r ro erty right as a prop-
public generally, for hIS partICulba Pol the public has been 
nd not as a mem er ) 
crty owner a R v State of California, supra. 
damaged. (See ,ose. are concerned with a property 
[8] In the instant case we h' h an owner has in the 
right known as ~he ri.ght of a~~essa;u;: and which is appur-
street upon whlCh ~IS prope y The function of the court 
tenant to su~h abuttmg lror::t~haracter and extent o~ that 
is to determme and de ne . b its terms general m na-
right. Th~ right of. ~ccess, db:~~;ifi:ation as to its extent and 
ture reqUIres defimtIOn ~n . here we are concerned 
' Th" especIally true w 
character. l~ IS. .. which requires that com-
with the constitutIOnal provIsIOn; t ken or damaged. The b . d here property IS a . pensation e pal w . 11 is firmly. established. 
property right of access ge~er~! this state and elsewher~ 
It has long been recogmze ~n .. public street hllS 
that an owner of property abuttmg upon a.. . 
.. ,,/'i 1, \/\F 
. ! 
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a property right in the nature of an easement in the street 
which is appurtenant to his abutting property and which is 
.his private right, as distinguished from his right as a mem. 
ber of the pUblic. That right has been described as an ease. 
ment of ingress and egress to and from his. property or, 
generally, the right of access over the street to and from his 
property, and compensation must be given for an impair-
ment thereof. We are not now inclined to question or disturb 
that rule. (See Rose v. State of California, supra; Eachus 
v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., 103 Cal. 614 [37 P. 750, 42 Am. 
St. Rep. 149J ; McCandless v. City of Los Angeles, 214 Cal. 
67 [4 P.2d 139J; Lane v. San Diego Elec. Ry. Co., 208 Cal. 
29 [280 P. 109]; Wilcox v. Engebretsen, 160 Cal. 288 [116 
P. 750J; Williams v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 592 [89 
P. 330] ; Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 124 Cal. 274 [57 P. 
82J ; Geurkink v. City of Petaluma, 112 Cal. 306 [44 P. 570J ; 
Bigelow v. Ballerino, 111 Cal. 559 [44 P. 307]; 10 Cal. Jur. 
333-335; 18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, secs. 181-185; 49 
A.L.R. 830; 98 A.L.R. 689.) The precise origin of that prop-
erty right is somewhat obscure but it may be said generally 
to have arisen by court decisions declaring that such right exi~ted and recognizing it. (See 18 Am~Jur., Eminent Do-
mam, sec. 181; 41 YaleL.J. 221.) For that reason, in the 
determination of the· extent and character of that right mo~t of the cases rely, without discussion, upon precedents 
whIch fit or are analogous to the circumstances present in the 
case before the court. If the question is one of first impres. 
sion its answer depends chiefly Upon matters of policy,' a 
factor the nature of which, although at times discussed by 
the courts, is usually left undisclosed. It may be suggested 
that on the one hand the policy underlying the eminent 
domain provision in the Constitution is to distribute through. 
out the community the loss inflicted upon the individual by 
the making of public improvements. (See 41 YaleL.J. 221. 
224; 52 Harv.L.Rev. 1176.1177; 3 Harv.L.Rev. 189-205.) 
Manifestly; the addition to the eminent domain clause in con. 
stitutions in most states, including California, of "or dam-
aged" to the word "taken" indicates an intent to extend that 
policy to embrace additional situations. On the other hand, 
fears have been expressed that compensation allowed too liber-
ally will seriously impede, if not stop, beneficial pUblic im. 
provements because of the greatly increased cost. (See Davis 
v. County Commissioners, 158 Mass. 218 [26 N.E. 848 850 
WAY N E H E ~ .'~ " 
ATTORNEY AT LAW \. 
r . . ~ 
2!5 TAYLOR ST. GR 4-80!54 
SAN FRANCISCO 2. CAUl=': 
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11 L.R.A. 750] ; 18 Va.L.Rev. 834:337;~ However, it is s~id 
that in spite of that so-called pohcy the courts ca~ot ~ . 
nore sound and settled principles of .law. safeguardmg t e 
rights and property of individuals. ThIS [Improvement] may 
be of great convenience to the public gencr~ly, bu: the prop~ 
erties of abutting owners ought not be sacrIfic~d I~ order t. 
't" . and quoting from Sedgwick on ConstItutional Law. secure I , , . f 'fi the 
,« The tendency under our system IS too 0 ten to sa~rI co . 
individual to the community; and it seems very difficult m 
reason to show why the State should not pay for, propert! 
which it destroys or impairs the value, ?B well as for whatfJIt 
h . II takes "(Liddick v. C'tty of Oouncil Blu s, pYSIcay .... , 
- Iowa - [5 N.W.2d 361, 372, 382].~ .,' • 
[9] In some degree those opposed pohcles are mamfested 
in the conflict between the constitutional. mandate that com~ 
pensation be paid when private pro~erty IS ~ken or damaged 
for a public purpose and the exerCIse of pohce power- where 
compensation need not be paid. The line ~etween those two 
concepts is far from clearly marked: It Will be recalled that 
in the instant case it is alleged that by reason of the lo,,:er. 
ing of Harrison Street fifty feet below the level ~f Sterlmg 
Street the access that plaintiff formerly had to HarrIson Street 
from Sterling Street has now been lost except for an alInost per-
pendicular flight of stairs. The condition resulted from the con-
struction of a public improvement, namely, approaches to a 
bridge spanning San Francisco Bay. It d?es not ~ppe~r that 
any compelling emergency or public necessIty.requlred Its con-
struction without the payment of compensatIOn for, property 
damaged. Therefore, the Stat~ may not escape the payment 
of compensation under the pohce power. 
The ultimate effect of lowering Harrison Street was to 
place plaintiff's property in a cul-de-sac. Wherea,s,. before he 
had access to Harrison Street, the next intersectmg stre~t 
from his property on Sterling Street, he now has acc~ss m 
one direction only, that is, to Bryant Street, ~e next mter-
secting street in the opposite direction. The eXistence of ac-
cess in one direction to the general system of streets has be?n 
impaired to the extent that there is now left only the staIr-
way. Plaintiff alleged that formerly Sterling Street was level 
with Harrison Street, which may be interpreted to mean that 
general access was available. He does state that formerly. he 
had access by a streetcar line and footpaths.. That bemg 
1\ 
I: :i p ,. 
i. 
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t his rue access by. those. modes has been lost except to the 
extent that the staIrway IS a substitute for pedestrian access 
In that resp.ect his property has been placed in a cul-de-sac: 
Moreover, hIS request for leave to amend may be construed 
to embrace a showing that formerly there was access to Harri-
s?n Street for vehicular traffic, or at least that there was a 
~Ight of ~ay or public street, improved or unimproved, join-
~ng SterlIng Street with Harrison Street. Furthermore it 
IS apparently conceded by defendants that a cul-de-sac 'has 
bee~cre~ted. That plaintiff's property has been damaged by 
t~e ImpaIrI;nent can;not be here questioned. The allegation in 
hIS complamt that It has been must be taken as true. 
[10] Whether or not such impairment is compensable 
must depend up.on the character and extent of his easement 
of a~cess. Does It extend to a right to pr.ss to the next inter- . 
sectmg streets? Nothing. more need be decided in this case; 
we are not ~oncerned WIth the correct rule in a ease where 
t~e obstructIOn occurs beyond the next intersecting street nor 
WIth wha~ ~he rule may be for rural property. Practically 
all authOrItIes hold, and we believe correctly, that no recovery 
may' be had where the obstruction is beyond the next inter-
sectmg street. (See cases cited: 4 McQuillin M .. I Corp t' [2d d] , UlllClpa o:a Ions e . , 279-280, sec. 1527; 1 Lewis on Eminent 
Domam [3d ed.], 350, 383, sees. 191, 203; 25 Am.Jur., High-
ways, see. 318; 49 A.L.R. 330; 93 A.L.R. 639.) [11] The 
?xtent of the easem.ent of access may be said to be that which 
IS reasonab~y reqUlred giving consideration to all the pur-
pose~ to whIch the property is adapted. It is obvious that in 
the m:stant case the damage suffered is greater and different 
~han If the obstruction had been beyond the next. intersect-
mg street. Where formerly plaintiff had an outlet from his 
property at both ends of Sterlin'" Street he now has 
at onl d h' h 0' access y. one en , w lC definitely affects ingress to and egress 
from hIS property. It would seem clear that the reasonable 
~odes of. egress and ingress would embrace access to the next 
~~ter~ectI~g street in both directions. It should be noted that 
e rIght IS mor.e exte~sive than the mere opportunity to go 
~n ;0 the street .1mm~dIately in front of the property. (Rose 
. tate o( Cal~forn~a, supra.) We are not confronted with 
th; necesslty of balancing the conflicting policies heretofore 
re erre.d. to without the aid of persuasive precedent. Man 
authorItIes an~ writers have either declared or intimate~ 
that the creatIOn of a cul-de-sac, that is, the blocking of 
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access to the next intersecting street in one direction is. com-
pensable, although the access still exists ~n .. the. opposit~ dir~c­
tion to. an intersecting street. In other words, the easement. 
is of that extent. (See Felton -v. State Highway Board, 47 
Ga.App. 615 [171 S.E. 1981; Oity of Ohicago -v. Baker, 39 
C.C.A. 318 [98 F. 8301; City of Ohicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 
103 [42 N.E. 178,49 Am.St.Rcp. 142, 29 L.R.A. 568]; Davis 
v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill. App. 244 [8 N.E.2d 3781; Falen-
der -v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [114 N.E. 965] ; O'Brien v. Oen-
tral Iron &7 Steel Co., 158 Ind. 218 [63 N.E. 302, 57 L.R.A. 
508] ; Magdefrau v. Washington County, 228 Iowa 853 [~93 
N.W. 5741; Liddick v. City of Council Bluffs, s~pra; H~gh­
barger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [80 P. 633]; Burton v. 
Fret£nd, 243 Mich. 679 [220 N.W. 672] ; Dean v. Ann Arbor 
R. R., 137 Mich. 459 [100 N.W. 773]; Vanderburgh v. City 
of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [108 N.W. 480, 6 L.R.A.N.S. 
741] ; Locascio v. Northern Pac. Ry. 00., 185 Minn. 281 [240 
N.W. 6611; In re Hun, 163 Minn. 439 [204 N.W. 534, 205 
N.W. 613, 49 A.L.R. 3201 j Lowell v. Buffalo Oounty, 123 Neb. 
194 [230 N.W. 842, 242 N.W. 452]; Mandell v. Board of 
Com'rs of Bernalillo County, 44 N;M. 109 [99 P.2d 108] ; In r8 
Grade Crossing Oom'rs, 210 App.Div. 328 [206 N.Y.S. 1031, 
aff'd 240 N.Y. 612 [148 N.E. 727] ; I'll. re William &7 North Wil-
Uam Streets, 103 Misc'-313 (171 N.Y.S.1l61, aff'd 188 App.Div. 
668 [177 N.Y.S. 318] ; Hiatt v. Oity of Greensboro, 201 N.C. 
515 [160 S.E. 748] ; Coy v. City of Tulsa, 2 F.Supp. 411; 
Atchison T. &7 S. F. Ry. Co. v. Terminal Oil Mill Co., 180 
Okla. 496 [71 P.2d6171; Sandstrom v. Oregon-Washington 
R. &7 Nav. Co., 69 Ore. 194 [146 P. 803,49 L.R.A.N.S. 8891; 
Cooke v. City of Portland, 136 Ore. 233 [298 P. 900] ; In re 
Vacation of Part of Melon Street, 182 Pa. 397 [38 A. 482,38 
L.R.A. 275]; Spang &7 Co. v. C()rrtmonweaUh, 281 Pa. 414 
[126 A. 781] j Hindes v. Allegheny Oounty, 123 Pa.Sup.Ct. 
469 [187 A. 219] ; Johnsen v. Old Colony R. Co., 18 R.I. 642 
[29 A. 594]; Illinois Oent. R. 00. v. Moriarity, 135 Tenn. 
446 [186 S.W. 10531 ; City of Texarkana v. Lawson, (Tex.Civ. 
App.) 168 S.W. 867; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, [2d 
ed.] vol. 4, 276-278; sees. 1526-1527 j Lewis on Eminent Do-
main, (3d ed.] vol. 1,350-351, sec. 191; 16 Harv.L.Rev. 372; 
39 YaleL.J. 128.) There are eases to the contrary (see 49 
A.L.R. 330, 93 A.L.R. 639), but some of them are based upon 
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~ constitutional provision which allows compensation for tak-
mg alone, no mention being made of a damaging. Many of 
them a~vance no sound .reason f?r not permitting recovery, 
a~d arrIve at the result wIth un enlIghtening phrases which fur-
nIsh no. real test. [12] We do not fe~r that permitting re-
co~ery m. cases of cul-de-sacs created in a municipality will 
serIOusly Impede the construction of improvements assuming 
the fear of such an event is real rather than fancied .• The dam-
age to the property owner is immediate and direct. The value 
of the use of the proper~y is directly affected. To be able to get 
o.nto the st::eet ImmedIately in front of the property is of 
lIttle val~e If tha~ is as far as he can go. If he has access to 
the next I~tersectmg s~re~t in both directions and one way is 
cut o.ff, hIS ease.ment, If It has any value to him at all, has 
c~rtamly been Impaired. We conclude, therefore, that the 
rIg~t of access extends in both directions to the next inter-
sectmg street. 
Defendants contend that there are cases in California con-
trary to the foregoing views. In Wolff v. Oity of Los Angeles, 
49 Ca1.App. 400 [193 P. 862], the portion of the street which 
was graded was a considerable distance from plaintiffs' prop-
erty ~nd bey~nd an intersecting street, as was pointed out 
by.thlS court In denying a hearing. In Oity of San Mateo v Ra~lroad Oommission, 9 Ca1.2d 1 [68 P.2d 713], it does no~ 
appear that the closing of the street placed the property 
owners on a cul-de-sac.. ~tree~s crossing the railroad right of 
way were closed, but It IS saId that as· far as appears from 
the rec~rd the pro~erty abutted upon either a county road or 
state hlgh~a.y w~lCh paralleled the sides of the railroad. Mor~over, It IS pomted out that the property owners were not 
partIes to a pr.oc~eding before the Railroad Commission and t~at t~~ commISSIOn had "not attempted to adjudicate such 
rIghts. The case was referred to and distinguished in Rose 
v. State of Oalifornia, supra, at page 731. While that case 
may h~ld that grade crossings may be eliminated pursuant to !~e pohce power, we .do not interpret it as holding that prop-
. ty . m~y be placed m a cuI-de-sac by the construction of a 
pubhc Improvement without the payment of compensation 
Reference is made to Bigley v. Nunan 53 Cal 403 dB' B d f S· ,. ,an rOWn 
v. oar 0 ~perv~ors, 124 Cal. 274 [57 P. 82]. Neither 
of those cases mvolved a cul-de-sac Both of the d . . . m were con-
cerne WIth a narrowmg of the width of a street. (See Har-
gra v. Hodgdun, 89 Cal. 623 [26 P 1106]) Th B· 1 
. . e 19 ey case 
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is based upon the theory that the right of access is not pecu-
liar and private to an abutting owner, which is out of har-
mony with Rose v. State of Oalifornia, supra, at pages 727-
728, and the authorities there cited. In the Brown case the 
only question before the court was . whether the board of 
supervisors had the power to narrow the width of the street 
by virtue of its authority to close .or vacate s~reets. The 
question of whether an action for damages under the Consti-
tution would lie was not involved. The discussion apparently 
to the contrary of the views herein expressed was unnecessary. 
Indeed, the court, near the close of its opinion, quoted with 
approval from Symons v. San Francisco, 115 Cal. 555, [42 
P. 913, 47 P. 453], where it was said: "Whether the order 
will have the effect to diminish the value of the plaintiffs' 
land, or to cause them damage, is nota ground for annulling 
the act of the board of supervisors, and cannot be considered 
in this proceeding. If the board of supervi,sors had the au, 
thorityto pass the order, and the plaintiffs have sustained 
any legal damage by reason thereof, they must seek reUef in 
a direct proceeding therefor.". (Emphasis added.) . 
Defendants contend that the creation of the· 'cul-de-sac 
causes nothing more than mere circuity of travel which is not 
compensable, citing Walff v. Oity of Los Angeles, supra. 
The inapplicability of that case has heretofore been discussed. 
In any event, the phrase "circuity' of travel" has varied 
meanings and· is frequently misused by the courts .. 
There is more than mercly a diversion of traffic when a 
cul-de-sac is created. The ability to travel to and from th'e 
property to the general system of streets in one direction is 
lost. One might imagine many circumstances, as has been 
shown by defendants, in which recovery should~ot"be pe:r~ 
mitted or where the reasons for recovery· in the cuI-de-sac 
cases might not be logically applied, hut we are. h.ere con-
cerned with the particular facts of this case and do not pur. 
port to declare the law for all cases. under allcircumstailces. 
[13] The other items of damages claimed by plaintiff' nrc 
not compensable. He asserts that all the.residences, except his 
own, in a described area in which his property is situated 
, : . .' . were eliminated by defendants, and that a street ratlway 
formerly operating on Sterling Street has been removed. 
There is no property right appurtenant to plaintiff's property 
on Sterling Street which entitles him to the maintenance 01 
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the residences or the continuous operation of the existing 
street railway. The removal of the residences and leaving the 
property vacant did not constitute a nuisance. It does not 
appear that the elevated road between plaintiff's property 
and Bryant Street in any way interferes with his access to 
the latter street or impairs any easement, if one exists, to 
light, air or view. 
The judgment is reversed, and the court below is directed 
to permit the plaintiff to amend his complaint if he be so 
advised in conformity with the views herein expressed. 
GibsoD) C. J., Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the conclusion that the judg-
ment against the property owner should be reversed, but for 
reasons different from those stated by my associates. And as 
the decision vitally affects the public interest in that it may 
largely determine whether highway improvements essential 
for modern transportation can be made without incurring 
liability for damages beyond the capacity of the state or a 
municipality reasonably to pay, I deem it appropriate to state 
the grounds upon which I believe the determination should 
rest. 
When the government acts, either by way of legislation or 
by the exercise of any other legitimate means,1 to promote the 
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare, a large 
area exists in which private interests may be restricted, im-
paired, or entirely destroyed by such action without compen-
sation for the resulting loss or diminution in value of the 
property. (Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 [48 S.Ct. 246, 
72 L.Ed. 568]; Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S, 16 [25 L.Ed. 
980] ; Omnia Oommercial 00. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 
[43 S.Ct. 437, 67 L.Ed. 773] ; Ex parte Hadacheck, 165 Cal. 
416 [132 P. 584, L.R.A. 1916B, 1248], affd. in Hadacheck v. 
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 [36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348] ; Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 00., 272 U.S. 365 [47 S.Ct. 114, 
71 L.Ed. 303]; Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 
U.S. 486 [36 S.Ct. 206, 60 L.Ed. 396]; Sligh v. Kirkwood, 
237 U.S. 52 [35 S.Ct. 501, 59 L.Ed. 835] ; Reinman v. Little 
l' 'The expression 'police power' is sometimes lised in a very broad 
sense, including all legislation and almost every function of civil gov-
ernment." 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, sec. 257, pp. 971, 972. 
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. [35 S Ct . 511, 59 L.Ed~ BOO].) Th~s . 
Rock, 237 U.S. 171 t t' 't in furtherance of the public 
f the O'overnmen 0 ac . "" '. to' . power 0 "'. • r bTt for the resultmg lllJury 
good without lllCUr~lllg la 1 \Y k own as the police power. 
private individuals IS co~mon that ~he Constitution supposes 
It 'has been held many lml~s er and must be construed 
the pre-existence of the po Ice powh.' &; NW R 00 v. t that fact (0 '/,Gago ...• 
with reference. 0 . III 625 [158 N.E.376, 55 A:L.R. 
Illinois Oommerce OO~t . .' 326St 'te Bd of Education, 168 La., 
54] B den v Lou'/,S~ana a· , 'd . k 6 j or, . 7 A L R 1183]' Oarthage v.Fre er'/,G , 
1005 [123 So. 655, 6 ... 19 An:.St.Rep. 490, 10 L.R.A. 
122 N.Y: 268 [25 N.EC i80'415 [58 P. 1071,77 Am.St.Rep. 
178] j Re Morgan, 26 ~t Am Jur Constitution'aILaw, sec. 
269, 47 L.R.A. 52] j see .', . 
245, p. 969.) l' of improvements is concerned, 
So far as the construc. Ion be to promote and insure 
however, even though theIr p~rpose the right of the State to 
the public safety and convemence, t f" J'ust" 
t" ithout the paymen 0 . 
take "pri:ate proper y ~essl forbidden by both the emi-compensatI~n, has. b.een e:~he state Constitution and the du.e 
nent dQmam provislon FO rteenth Amendment to the Consti-
process clause of .the ou I Const., art. I, sec. 14; 
tution of the Umted States. Oh(~a. 166 US 226 [17 S.Ct. 
Oh ' B &; Q R ROo. v. wago, . . . . 'f ~cago. ..' Ob' I under these prOVISIons, 1 
581, 41 L.Ed. 979).) vlo':litself for a public use, i~ is 
the State approPrIate~ the. la t domain with a correspondmg 
exercising its power 0 emlll:: lue of the land. And the 
liability to pay the owne~ ~i=tion' entitling the owner to 
amendment to .the. state ons his ro erty is "damaged," 
just compensatlO~ ~n ,;:~::~e~~r th: p~liC use, indicates an 
as well as when 1 IS '. f om ensation in the area 
intention to li?er~li~e the p~~c~:gu~she~ from an actual ap-
of conse~uentIal mJury, as s An eles' Ry., supra, p. 616; 
propriatlOn. (Eachus .v. L~~ Caf 492 501 [6 P. 317, 56 
Reardon v. San Franc~sco,. . . . ' ra) The term 
Am.Rep. 109] ; Rigney ;~ ?~ty 01 ~h:~~i~:Pa diminution in 
"consequential damage, IS use. d b the State occlUlioned 
value. of land not actually acqUlre Y , 
by the public improvement. . d that not all consequen-
But it is uniformly recogmze . ded to be included 
tial damage to private int~res~ ;;:at:t:~ause. In the words 
within the scope of the emmen l . Coal Co v Mahon, 
of Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsy vanw • • 
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260 U.S. 393, 412 [43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322]: "Government 
hardly could go on if, to some extent, values incident to prop-
erty co~ld not be diminished without paying for every such cha~ge In .the gen:ral. law [as the Pennsylvania statute under 
cons.IderatIOn forbIddIng the mining of coal within 150 feet of 
the ~mp:oved property of another]. . .. One fact for consid-
~ratIOn m determining ... [the] limits [of the police powerJ 
IS the. exten: of the diminution. When it reaches a certain 
~,agmtude: In most if not in all cases there must be an exer-
CIse of emIne~t domain and compensation to sustain the act. 
So the queS~IOn depends upon the particular facts." The 
?ourt r.ecogmzed that the question as to when compensation 
lS reqUIred to be made for a diminution in value of private 
property under the eminent domain clause cannot be disposed 
of by general prop~sitions; t?e problem is one "of degree." 
(p. 416.) Also thIS court, m Rose v. State of California 
19 Cal.2d 713, 737 [123 P 2d 505] held that th d·. .' 
. I ., e Immutlon ~n va ue of. land occasioned by a public improvement divert-
mg the mam flow of traffic from in front of the .. premISes IS 
noncompensable. And the government may condemn private 
property ~nd ere.ct upon it a jail or "pest house" without 
?omp.ensatmg adJacent property owners for the undeniable 
ImpaIrment of their property values as a result of such public 
u;;. P (See Eachus v. Los Angeles·etc. Ry., J03 Cal. 614, 617 
[ .. 75.0, 42 A~.St.Rep. 149J; Rigney v. Chicago 102 ill ~\~803; Cdy of W~nchester v .. Ring, 312 Ill. 544, 550-552 [144 
. . 33, 36 A.L.R. 520] ; C~ty of Geary v. Moore 181 Okl 
6716 [75 P.2d 891], distinguishing Oklahoma City' v. Vette~· 
2 Okla. 196 [179 P. 473, 4 A.L.R. 1009].) , 
From these decisions it seems clear that a ,determ· f 
as to. w~ether the diminution in value of land resultin~n~r~: pubh~ Improvement, as distinguished from a taking of the ~and ~tself for. p~blic use, falls within the scope of eminent 
omalI~ nece~sItatmg th~ payment of compensation requires 
a consIderatIOn of the Importance of the . t t ff . (St t f C· . meres a ected 
a e 0 alifornw v. Marin Mun. W. Dist., 17 Cal.2d 699· 
706 [11~ P.2d 651J.) In considering this problem the court ~ust weIgh the relative interests of the public and th . d' vId~al, ;~ as to arrive at a just balance in order that g~~:r~~ ~en WI. not be unduly restricted in the proper exercise of ~s fu~ctlOn for the public goodj while at the same time giving 
u~ e ect ~o t?~ policy in the eminent domain clause of in-
surmg the mdivldual against an unreasonable loss occasioned 
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by the exercise of governmental power. In this connection, 
a distinction must be made between a diminution in value 
because of an act of a private individual and the decrease in 
value resulting from a public highway improvement. Obvi-
ously, the courts will be more ready to protect even the less 
important interests connected with the use of land against 
interference by private individuals whose acts have no pubhc 
utility, than when the governmental power is exercised in 
behalf of a public improvement for the general welfare. 
Therefore, the fact that a particular interest has been pro-
tected against impairment by a private person does not neces-
sarily mean that it is of sufficient importance, as against 
the state, to be included in the terrn "private property" 
within the meaning of the eminent doma,in clause of the Con-
stitution. (See, for example, the discussion of the distinction 
between impairment of view by a private individual and by 
a proper highway improvement, in my dissenting opinion in 
People v. Ricciardi, post, p. 390 [144 P.2d 799].) The factors 
to be considered are, on the one hand, the magnitude of the dam-
age to the owner of the land, and, on the other-, the desirability 
and necessity for the particular type of improvement and the 
danger that the granting of compensation will tend to retard 
or prevent it. (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra; 
Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn .. 357, 366, 369 [111 
A. 354, 12 A.L.R. 669] ; Davis v. Oounty Commrs., 153 Mass. 
218 [26 N.E. 848, 11 L.R.A. 750J ; Cram v. City of Laconia, 
71 N.H. 41 [51 A. 635, 57 L.R.A. 282] ; Richmond v. City of 
Hinton, 117 W.Va. 223 [185 S.E. 411]; see 34 Columb.L .. Rev. 
938; 42 Columb.L.Rev. 596, 637; and .seeArcher. v .O~ty of 
Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19, 23, 24 11~~~.2<k;l] ;O/1jIa".a,,~~ 
L. A. County Flood etc. Dist., 19 Ca1.2d .61i 63 :[119. P .. 2d 
23].) •. if; '. !. .;"i 
In addition, before compensation maybe denied,.th~;cour~ 
must find that the particular improvemen~ is not.~nrea~ 
sonably more drastic or injurious than necessary, to achieve 
the public objective. (Williams v. Los An{}"eZes ~y. Co? 15.0 
Cal. 592, 595, 596 [89 P. 330] ; Lanev. Sa~Diego EZec. ,Ry; 
Co., 208 Cal. 29, 35 [280 P. 109] ; TO,wn, of .Winds.or v. :Wh.it-
ney, supra, p. 369; Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla. 107 (100 ,So. 
147,33 A.L.R. 682] ; and see note, 35 Columb.L.Rev. 938, 939; 
11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, sec. 266, p.l006.) Thus, if, 
in balancing these factors, the court decides that the interelilt 
360 BACICH v. BOARD OF CONTROL r23 C.2d 
~ffected by the improvement which results in a diminution 
In the value of the land is of sufficient importance to require 
the payment of compensation under the eminent domain clanse 
of the Constitution, it is not necessary to consider the im-
provemeD;t as a "damaging" of the land; since the interest 
IS recognIzed as entitled to the protection of the law, it be-
com~ a 'pr~perty righ~ included in the term "private prop-
erty . wIt.hIn the meamng of article I, section 14 of the state 
ConstItutIon. In the event, however, that the interest is 
deemed Of. insufficient magnitude to warrant the payment of 
compensatIOn under the eminent domain provision it obvi-
ously is not "private property" within the scop~ of that 
cla~e, and the diminution in value of the land attributable 
to It, when affected by public improvement, falls within the 
area. of uncompensated loss occasioned by the exercise of es-
sentIal governmental power. (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma-
hon, supra, see Rose v. State of California, S~tpra, at p. 737.) 
.And the Supreme Court of the United States has indicated 
that ~he recogni.tio?- and definition of the interests in prop-
e~ty Included wIthIn the term "private property" are essen-
~Ial1y matte~s which each state is permitted to determine for 
Itself. (Rc1,chelderfcr v.Quinn, 287 U.S. 315 319 [53 S Ct 
177, 77 L.Ed. 331,83 A.L.R. 1429] ; Sauer v. New York, 206 
u.s. 536, 548 [27 KCt. 686, 51 L.Ed. 1176].) 
In balancing the necE-ssity for a public improvement against 
the ext~nt of d~mage sustained by an individual in order to 
dete~In~ .the r1g~t to compensation, there need be no fear 
t~at IndIVId~al rIghts will be unduly subordinated to the 
rIghts ~f SOCIety, for each claimed exercise of governmental 
power IS su~ject to judicial examination as to whether the 
means exerc~sed are reasonable, both in nature and extent. 
(Town of Wtndsor.v. Whitney, supra, at p. 369.) And although 
the rule may be dI~cult to apply, it is not an arbitrary one. 
An analogous doctrIne underlies a determination of the rea-
so~ableness of conduct in the law of negligence, which re-
~Ulres a. court to weigh the magnitude of the risk involved 
~n a p~rtI7u~ar act against its utility or the particular manner 
In W~lC? .It IS d~n.e. (2 Rest., Torts, sec. 291.) Obviously, as 
the JU~IcIal dec:sIOns on the subject increase in number, the 
result In a specIfic case may be predicted with increasing ac-
curacy. (Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 [31 
S.Ct. 186, 55 L.Ed. 112].) One rule recently anIlounced by 
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this court in approaching such a proble!ri- is: that~,~~ ,~eaSt ,if 
the property owner would have no eanse ?f;a.C~IO~ )ver~ !1 
Private person to inflict the damage, he, ca~,cl~l:rn ,n();I~~m: h ' C·t· 'f' 'L '.Ange~es pensation from the state. (Arc er v. .~ y: 0 . ; "Dsr't:(.,j,' 
supra, at p. 24.) But in the area ofindIytdual .~lglit~ ~yet 
uncharted by judicial decision, a court must weIgh the mter-
ests affected in each case. '.' . '. ..' 
The question whether a property owner. is entitled t? coT?~ 
pensation under the eminent domain clause of, t~~ Cal~fo:ma 
Constitution (art. I, sec. 14) when his property IS pl~ce~ m a 
cul-de-sac by the obstruction or vacation. of:, o~e'}~d' of a 
street upon which the property abuts, butwhe.t;e tl(~ ~bstrue­
tion is not directly in front of the property, }s/o,~~ ~f. first 
impression in California. Althoug.h an mt~r~~r?~~~'\V1t~ the 
abutting owner's right of access m one. dlrec:~a0Il:0:UY'. ~u~ 
leaving a less convenient means of egres~ 1TI anoth~r direc:lo~, 
has been held not to be a taking of prIvate pr?p'~rty WithIn 
the prohibition of the due process clause of •• ~e:F~nrl:eenth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution (Met/6rv., C1,ty of 
Richmond, 172 U.S. 82 [19 S.Ct. 106!, 41 L.E.d .. 199]), a 
majority of the courts which have consldered the rIght of a 
property owner to damages, under the. eminent· dom~in clause 
of the jurisdiction, for bej.ng placed 1TI a cm-de-sac have .al-
lowed recovery to those in the block where the obstruction 
occurs, even though one entrance to the block is left open. 
(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [171 S.E. 
198] ; City of Chicago v. Baker,-39 C.C.A. 318 [98 F. 830]; 
City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [4~ N.E. 17~, 49 Am. 
St.Rep. 142, 29 L.R.A. 568]; Davis v. edy of Chwago, 290 
Ill.App. 244 [8 N.E.2d 378]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 
455 [114 N.E. 965, 967] ; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 
[80 P. 633]; Burton v. Freun~, 243 ~ich. 67? [220 N:W· 
672]. Vanderburgh v. City of M1,nneapoltS,98 Mmn,329 [108 N.W~ 480, 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741] ; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123 
Neb. 194 [230 N.W. 842,242 N.W.452] ; Co~ v. City of Tulsa, 
2 F.Supp. 411; Atchison etc. Ry. v. Term~nal Oil M~ll Co., 
180 Okla. 496 [71 P.2d 617]; Sandstrom v. Oregon-Wash. 
R. &; Nav. Co., 69 Ore. 194 [146 P. 803,.49 L.R.A;N.S. 889] ; 
In re Melon Street, 182 Pa.397 [38 A. 482,38 A.L.R. 275] ; 
City of Texarkana v. Lawson, (Tex.Civ.App.) 168 S.W. 867. 
Contra: Kachele v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co.,' 109 Conn. 151 
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[149 A. 408]; l'aylor v. Oooke, 113 Conn. 162 [154 A. 349, 
351] ; Krebs v. Uhl, 160 Md. 584 [154 A. 131], distinguishing 
Johnson v. Mayor, 148 Md. 432 [129 A. 648] ; Smith v. Boston, 
61 Mass. 254; Davis v. Oounty Oommrs., 153 Mass. 218 [26 
N.E. 848, 11 L.R.A. 7501; Nichols v. Inhabitants of Rich-
mond, 162 Mass. 170 [38 N.E. 501] ; Arcadia Realty 00. v. 
Oity of St. Louis, 326 Mo. 273 [30 S.W.2d 995, 997] ; Wilson 
v. Kansas Oity, -- Mo. -- [162 S. W.2d 802]; Oram v. 
Oity of Laconia, 71 N.H. 41 [51 A. 635,57 L.R.A. 282] ; New 
York etc. Ry. v. Bucsi, 128 Ohio 134 [190 N.E. 562, 93 A.L.R. 
632] ; Oity of Bellevue v. Stedman. 138 Ohio 281 [34 N.E.2d 
7~9] ; Oity of ~ynchburg v. Peters, 145 Va. 1 [133 S.E. 674J ; 
Rwhmond v. O~ty of Hinton, 117 W.Va. 223 [185 S.E. 411].) 
But by the great weight of authority, as a matter of law, no 
compensation may be obtained because of an obstruction to 
or the vacation of a street in another block, even though the 
value of the complaina.nt's property is substantially re-
duced thereby, and this regardless of whether the particular 
state Constitution requires compensation solely for property 
"t k " "t k d d . a en or a en or amage ." (O~ty of East St. Louis v. 
O'Plynn, 119 Ill. 200 [10 N.E. 395, 59 Am.Rep. 795]; Buhl 
v. Port St. Union Depot 00., 98 Mich. 596 [57 N.W. 829, 23 
L.R.A. 392J; Locascio v. Northern Pac. Ry. 00., 185 Minn. 
281 [240 N.W. 661] ; In re Hull, 163 Minn. 439 [204 N.W. 
534, 5.38-540, 205 N.W. 613, 49 A.L.R. 320] ; Ohicago etc. Ry. 
v. Pngmore, 180 Okla. 124 [68 P.2d 90] ; Oooke v. Oity of 
Portland, 136 Ore. 233 [298 P. 900] ; Spang & Co. v. Oommon-
wealth, 281 Pa. 414 [126 A. 781]; Hindes v. Allegheny 
Oounty, 123 Pa.Sup.Ct. 469 [187 A. 219] ; Hyde v. Minnesota 
etc. Ry., 29 S.D. 22 [136 N.W. 92,99,40 L.R.A.N.S. 48] ; Lee 
v. Oity of Stratford [Tex.Com.App., adopted by Supr. Ct.], 
125 Tex: 179,81 S.W.2d 1003; Oity of El Paso v. Sandfelder, 
(Tex. CIv.App.) 118 S.W.2d 950; Jackson v. Birmingham etc. 
00.,154 Ala. 464 [45 So. 660] ; Whitsett v. Union Depot & R. 
00., 10 Colo. 243 [15 P. 339] ; Jarnagin v. Louisiana High-
way Oom., (La.A~p.). 5 So.2d 660; Mandell v. Board of 
Oommrs. of Bernahllo 00., 44 N.M. 109 [99 P.2d 108] ; Sand-
ers. v. To~n of Smithfield, ~21 N.C. 166 [19 S.E.2d 630]; 
Chwago ill N. W. Ry. v. Ra~lroad Oom., 167 Wis. 185 [167 
N.W.266].) 
The quest~o~ im.mediately arises as to the reason, if any, 
for such a dIstInctIOn. What are the factors which have in-
duced courts to recognize the damage of one owner as com-
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pensable and that of another as noncompensable when the dim-
inution in value of the properties of both is occasioned by 
the same public' act T So far as the mere inconvenience of 
traveling any additional distance necessitated by the inability 
longer to use the obstructed street is concerned, no compelling 
reason for such a distinction is warranted by logic, as it is 
difficult to justify the denial of compensation to· dne whose 
property is located directly across the firstinte'rsectmg street' 
while allowing recovery to the person owning ; the' lot on the 
corner of the block in which the cul-de-sM~xists;:A.nd be-
cause many of the courts have confined cOnBiderationof the 
damage caused by the obstruction to what they term the neces-
sity for "circuity of travel," the conclusion that th~ allow-
ance of recovery shouId not be extended to the whole 'neigh-
borhood with a probable throttling of public· improvements, 
has influenced a substantial number of them to deny compen-
sation altogether. (Dantzer v. Indianapolis Union Ry., 141 
Ind. 604 [39 N.E. 223, 50 Am.St.Rep. 343, 34 L.R.A. 769] ; 
Nichols, v. Inhabitants of Richmond, (Mass.) supra; Oram v. 
Oity of Laconia, (N.H.) supra; Henry L. Doherty & 00. v. 
Joachim, 146 Fla. 50 [200 So. 238].) Also some decisions 
which follow the majority view have treated recovery in a 
cul-de-sac case as an exception to the rule generally an-
nounced that circuity of travel occasioned by a proper high-
way improvement, or regulation, is a noncompensable item of 
damage. 
But the traveling of additional distances occasioned by 
modern traffic engineering to make travel more safe and to 
adapt the highway system to the adequate disposal of the 
increasingly heavy burden of automobile traffic--:-as, for ex-
ample, by the construction of divided highways fori, variou& 
types of traffic, or the re-routing of traffic by one-",ay regU.;' 
lations or the prohibition of left-hand turns-"'--Js anele.rilt~nt 
of damage for which the property bwner1maynot (coriipl~iIi' 
in the absence of arbitrary action. '(OitfJ'of 8aiYt'¥ateo l v. 
Railroad Oom., 9 Ca1.2d 1, 9, 10 [68 P"2d;,71:3] ; 8e~'rnote '1()O( 
A.L.R. 487, 491-493.) It is, therefor~,hot;'$U:fprfsingjt~~t; 
many courts have refused compensation·;iJftchl~de.:sa~!;Ms~k 
because of the similarity in problems'so faras'tl1e qttestio:iit 
of circuity is concerned. And,' therefore, hCteSting !fi:ie~.':Diiitits~ 
of the majority rule, mere "circuity'of,travel,'~ m. the-sen~e; 
that it refers to the additional distan<le . required to be tra:" 
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versed because of a proper highway construction should not 
be us~d to justify the allowance of compensation to the owner 
ab~ttIng upon the street in the block where the obstruction 
eXIsts. 
. There is a material difference, however, between the situa-
tIon of. the property owner in the block where one end of the 
street IS obstructed and that of the persons whose lots abut 
on the same street beyond the first intersection. Whereas 
f~rmerly he had an outlet at both ends of the street on which 
hIS .lot fronts, after the obstruction, he has but one. This is 
obv~ously not true .of the landowners beyond the first inter-
sectIOn, . for they stIll have access in either direction. 
. B~t, ~t may be asked, of what practical significance is this 
dIStInction, so far as damage to the' property owner is con-
cerne~ , If, for example, the land is used for business or in-
dustrIal purposes, the fact that it is in a block where the 
~treet t~rmi?ates may seriously affect the easement of access, 
In cons~derIng the full and benefieial use of the propert 
All vehic!es entering the block must either turn around :; 
back out In order to leave it, to this extent impairing the right 
of egre~s. In the case of trucks or other large vehicles such 
a reqUIrement may sUbstantially interfere with the highest 
and be~t use of the property. (See Cartmell v. City of 
Marysv~lle, 231 Ky. 666 [22 S.W.2d 102, 104].) And the 
owner of a lot so located is more adversely affected than is 
one whose property abuts upon a street restricted to one-way 
traffic, for In the latter case free ingress and egress is possible 
.y ~t, even though the interference with the use of the land 
wIthIn the block where the cul-de-sac is created is materially 
1reater than that of the property beyond the first intersec-
t on upon the same. street, the question remains whether the 
owner s access to hIS property is so materially affected as to 
warr~nt the. ~ayment of compensation under the eminent 
domaIn prov~IOn of the California Constitution. 
The n.ecesslty .for arterial freeways, uninterrupted by nu-
m~rous Interse~tlOns, in order to dispose of vehicular traffic 
~ll ely and efficIently is a matter of growing public concern 
owance of ~amages. to the property owners on each street 
form.erly crOSSIng a hIghway which is to be rebuilt for the 
reqUIrements of fast moving or interurban traffic for a dis-
tan~e ~f a few or many miles, even if confined to one block on 
eac sIde of the freeway, might prove so burdensome as to 
stop or substantially decrease needed improvements. (See 
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Davis v. County Commrs. [Mass.], supra, at p. 850; Cram v. 
City of Laconia [N. H.], supra; Richmond v. City of HUtton 
[W. Va.], supra; 13 Va. L. Rev. 334~337.) Itm:nst be remeDi~ 
bered also that to the amount of damages awarded must be 
added the probable expense of defending hull.dre'ds of 'suits. 
At the same time, however, in view of the policy underlying 
the eminent domain provision of the Constituticin;; the ,court 
must give adequate recognition to the liardship:,to)lillndi;. 
vidual in a block ending in a dead end,mate-rially' 'idrect~g~ 
as the obstruction does, the right of egreSs from' his prop~rti· 
In addition, the possibility of locating, and: constructing tli~ 
improvement in such a way as to leave the properlY ,OWh~l­
with II. way out in each direction along thestre¢t upon whicli 
he abuts has a direct connection with 'thelrniitation that,' iIi 
order to avoid liability for compertsa1ion,'the'pladement('of 
the improvement and its manner of constrlictionmust" not 
be unreasonably more drastic or injurious than isreasonabl, 
required to achieve the necessary end. For eXample,', ordi~ 
narily, in constructing an arterial freeway the Objectives of 
the project may be served and a method of egress provided 
for property owners by the construction of lOcal service roads, 
paralleling the main freeway, into which the ~raffic:' from the 
side streets may pass and enter or cross the freeway at loca~ 
tions consistent with safety. (See People v. Ricciardi, post.) 
Were the construction of such service roads to 'be approved 
as a proper use of the land owned by the state for highway 
purposes without subjecting the state to liability to abutting 
property owners for such improvements, the cost. of such 
service roads would constitute a definitely ascertainable item, 
thus obviating the uncertainty in estimati.il.g in advance· the 
damages to the property owners, were the streets to be 'termi~ 
nated so as to create cul-de-sacs. Under such circumstances, 
where governing authorities fail or. refuse to . include such 
service roads as a part of the project, or in the relatively few 
situations where their construction is not possible, the dam-
age sustained by the individual should be borne by the pub-
lic. But the majority opinion in the Ricciardi case, by creat-
ing a cause of action in every property owner abutting upon 
the lane constructed for local traffic along the route of an 
arterial highway, certainly offers no inducement to the state 
to include such features in highway improvements, and makes 
the balancing of the respective interests of the public and 
the land owner a close question. However, bec,ause circum-
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stances readily can be visualized where, after a block is closed 
at one end, the owner's access to his property from the street 
may be as effectively blocked as though an obstruction were 
~laced directly in front of his premises/ in my opinion the ques-
tIon of compensa?le impairment of ingress and egress should 
be left for the trIer of fact to determine. 
. Bu~ in ascertaining the amount of damage arising from the 
ImpaIrment of the easement of access, the jury may consider 
only compensable elements of injury, relating to the inter-
ference. with the ingress to and egress from the property inso-
far as It affects the uses to which the property is adaptable. 
Su~h elements as the additional distance which one is re-
qUIred to travel upon the public street in order to reach the 
prop~rty and the divergence of travel occasioned by the high-
way II?provements should be excluded from the testimony of 
th~ ~Itn~sses and the consideration of the jury. (People v. 
R~ccwrd2, supr'!; Rose. v. S~ate of Oalifornia, s'upra, at p. 737; 
Dantzer v. Indwnapohs Umon Ry., supraj Grigg Hanna Lum-
ber, etc., Co., v. Van Wagoner, 294 Mich. 346 [293 N.W. 675, 
678-679]; Tomaszewski v. Palmer Bee 00., 223 Mich. 565 
[194 N.W. 571] ; Atchison etc. Ry; v. Terminal Oil Mill Co. 
(Okla.), supra, at p. 619; Ohicago etc. Ry. v. Prigmore (Okla.), 
supra, at pp. 91,92; Henry L. Doherty &; Co. v. Joachim (Fla.), 
supraj Oanady v. Ooeur D'Alene Lumber 00., 21 Idaho 77 
[120 P. 830]; Jarnagin v. La. Highway Com. (La. App.), 
sup.ra,· Sanders v. Town of Smithfield (N.C.), supra, at p. 634; 
Ohu;ago & N. W. Ry. v. Railway Com. (Wis.), s'upra.) 
. ~URTI.S,. J.-I agree with the conclusion reached in the rna-
JO~It! OpInIOn on the ground expressed in the concurring 
OpInIOn. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion declares that the allowance of re-
covery to the owner in this case "depends largely upon the 
c?arac.ter and extent of his property right." It seeks such a 
;~gh: In th~ right of ingress and egress which, it declares, 
beIng by Its terms general in nature requires definition and' 
I IF ~ 
or example, a truck which formerly entered the street sto ed in 
f!ont of the landowner '8 industrial premises and then in ieavi~P ~n~~d along the street in the same direction: may bec~use of theg~.f~~ 
o e street, be unable to turn around in it after o'ne end is blocked and 
for that reason, bo unablo to usc the street for access to the land. ' 
i-
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clarification as to its extent and character." What follows is 
a definition amplifying that right to -make it a b'a:sis for re-' 
covery in the present case in terms of the invasion of property 
rights. As there is no invasion of traditional rights, a new 
right is created by the simple process of redefinition'. The 
frontiers of the right of ingress and egress are thus freely 
advanced to make the very recovery in question a foregone 
conclusion. ' 
The real basis of the decision must be found in the consid-
erations that moved the majority to grant recovery .. The key 
to those considerations lies in the statement in the majority 
opinion that "If the question is one of first imp'tes'sion its 
answer depends chie:tly upon matters of p6licy,a i factor the 
nature of which, although at times discussed by the courts, 
is usually left undisclosed." By way of revelation in the pres~ 
ent case, the opinion goes on to declare' that "on the one' 
hand the policy underlying the eminent domain provision 
in the Constitution is to distribute throughout the community 
the loss infEcted upon the individual by the making of pub-
lic improvements . . . On the other hand, fears have, been 
expressed that compensation allowed too liberally will serio' 
ously impede, if not stop, beneficial public' improvements 
because of the greatly increased cost ... In some degree those 
opposed policies are manifested in the conflict between the 
constitutional mandate that compensation would be paid when 
private property is taken or damaged for a public, purpose 
and the exercise of the police power where compensation need 
not be paid." 
One is led to expect that the solution of the problem will 
lie in the weighing of these two policies, but it is not clear 
that the majority arrives at its solution in this manner. A 
review of the facts is summarily followed by the rule for 
which the case now stands: "It would 'seem clear that the 
reasonable modes of egress and ingress embrace access to the 
next intersecting street in both directions. It should be noted 
that the right is more extensive than the mere opportunity to 
go on to the street immediately in front of' the property.'~,' 
Having thus reached its conclusion: without stating why one 
policy outweighed the other, the opinion suggests thatitbal~ 
anced policies with the aid of precedents. "Weare not con-
fronted with the necessity of balancing thecon:tlicting (policies 
heretofore referred to without the aid, of persuash:e prece~ 
dent." It is thus left in doubt whether' the weigJ1ilig ofpoH. 
i 
!. iI' ~ ! 
! ; 
. , 
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cies or the persuasive precedents served as the basis of the 
opinion. There is an intimation that it was the latter in the 
statement: "Many authorities and writers have either de-
clared or intimated that the creation of a cul-de-sac, that is, 
the blocking of access to the next intersecting street in one 
direction is compensable, although the access still exists in 
the opposite direction to an intersecting street. In other words, 
the easement is to that extent." A list of cases from other 
states, together with citations to texts and law reviews is 
appended to support this statement,1 The conclusion is first 
reached and then justified in a manner that suggests a weigh~ 
ing of policies: ' , We do not fear that permitting recovery in 
cases of cul-de-sacs created in a municipality will seriously 
impede the construction of improvements, assuming the fear 
of such an event is real rather than fancied. The damage to 
the property owner is immediate and direct. The value of 
the use of the property is directly affected. To be able to get 
onto the street immediately in front of the property is of 
little value if that is as far as he can go. If his access to the 
next intersecting street in both directions and one way is cut 
off, his easemel,lt, if it has any value to him at all, has cer-
tainly been impaired. We conclude, therefore, that the right 
of access extends in both directions to the next intersecting 
street." Being more concerned with t.he reduction in value 
of plaintiff's property than with the fear that the allowance 
lTh.ere are also persuasive precedents against this conclusion: Meyer 
v. Richmond, 172 U.S. 82 (19 S.at. 106, 41 L.Ed.199]; New York C. 4' 
St. L. R. Co. v. Bucsi, 128 Ohio St. 134 [190 N.E. 562]; City Of Bellevue 
ele reI. Vickery v. Stedman, 138 Ohio St. 281 [34 N.E.2d 769] j Davis 
v. County Commissioner8, 153 Mass. ·218 [26 N.E. 848, 11 L.R.A. 750J j 
Nichols v. Inhabitants Of Richmond, 162 Mass. 170 [38 N.E. 501J j 
Warner v. New York, N. H. 4' H. R. Co., 86 Conn. 561 [86 A. 23J • 
Cram v. City of LacOnia, 71 N.H. 41 [51 A. 635, 57 L.R.A. 282J i 
Kachele v. BridgelMrt Hydraulic Co., ·109 Conn. 151 (145 A. 756]. 
Micone v. City of Midc'lletown, 110 Conn. 664 (149 A. 408J; Taylor .;, 
Cooke, 11~ Conn. 162 [154 A. 349]; Kreb8 v. Uhl, 160 Md. 584 [154 A. 
131] j Ch~cago 4' N. W. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Com., 167 Wis. l!i5 116t 
N.W. 266] j Arcadia Realty Co. v. City of St. Louis 326 Mo. 273 [30 
S .. W.2d 995J; Wilson v. Kansas City, -- Mo. -_ [162 S.W.2d. 802J; O~ty of Lynchburg v. Peters, 145 Va. 1 [133 S.E. 674]; Jarnagin v. Louisi-
ana Highway Com., (La.App.) 5 So.2d 660; Powell v. McKelvey, 
56 Idaho 291 [53 P.2d 626J; Kemp v. City of Seattle, 149. 
Wash. 197 [270 P. 431J; PoniMhil v. Hoquiam Sash d Door Co., 41 
Wash. 303 [83 P. 316]; City Of Fort Smith v. Van Zandt, 197 Ark. 91 
[122 S.W.2d 187]; Ralph v. Hazen, 68 App.D.C. 55 [93 F.2d 68J; 
Freeman v. City of Centralia, 67 Wash. 142 [120 P. 886, Ann.Cas. 1913D 
786J; Richmond v. City Of Hinton, 117 W.Va. :!:!;l [11l5 S.E. ~IIJ' 
Olsen v. Jacobs, 193 Wash. 506 [76 P.2d 607J; De R08sette v. Jet!er80~ County, 28S Ky. 407 [156 S. W.2d !ti5 J. 
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of recovery will impede improvements, ~he majority allows 
recovery and thus creates th~ prop~~y rIght.. ... 
It is implicit in the majorIty opmIOn, ho,,:ever, tha~ such 
a property right was already inherent in the nght,. a~tte,d1y 
of obscure origin, of ingress and egress. The op:m~n states 
that in spite of the policy not to impede. beIleficIa~ II?P:ove-
ments "the courts cannot ignore soun,dand settl~d p~m~lpl~~ 
of law safeguarding the rights and property o~ md~Vld~:~. t 
It also states, after describing the cul-de-sac In ~~e pI' ,en 
case, "that plaintiff's property .has b,~en~,a~~~~d,by t~i 
impairment cannot be here qu~stlOned.. ~h~ s~~t~lYlent ;t~~i 
"If he has access to the next mtersectmg-stree.t ~n ~otli, dl 
rections and one way is cut off, his eas~~e~t')~'!~,lias, a~r 
value to him at all, has certainl! been)~,~;~l:';~,.'~.s~~, 
that plaintiff's easement emb:a?es the,rIg~t}n,~ti~~10~." 
Whether the majoritybPImo~·· all~;ws '"r~c.0v:e~ ,~.n . ~h.~ 
ground· that there has been .a~ ,~paIrme~t,'of,,~~~;,~'pe1 
right inhering in the right of mgress~d ~g;,ess',,'or ·on t,~ 
ground that such a right should now be Judiclall~ create~} 
cannot subscribe to it. . , . h' 
. The basic question in this appeal is whether'~,e':p:operty 
that plaintiff alleged was taken ordam~gedexlsted ,~t al~~ 
If the· abutting owner has an easement m .the.stree~ 'longI~ 
tudinally to the next intersection inea~h dIrectIon, compen,. 
sation must be paid for the impairment: of that easemen~. 
(See United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333,339 [30'S.Ct. 521, 
54 L.Ed. 787].) If he does not have such aneaseme~t ~e cat?-
'have no recovery even though the value '. of the a~uttmg prop-
erty may be diminished as a result· of the Improvement. 
(Reichelderfer v. Quinn; 287 U. S. 315;~19[53S..Ct.17~, 77 
L.Ed. 331, 83 A.L.R. 1429] ; Eachus'v',Los 4,ngeles et~'llifl; 
00., 103 Cal. 614, 617 [37 P.750, 42 Am.Sp~ep., 1491; Ro8,~ 
v. State of Oalifornia, 19 Cal. 2d 713,,73?,744 [~23 P;~~ 
505] ; Rigney v. Ohicago, 102 Ill. 64,80; 'Ody .of Wtnchester 
v. Ring, 312 Ill. 544, 550, 552 [144 N.E.333, 36 A.L.R. 5201, 
118 A.L.R. 921.) . . f' .d 
There is nothing in the history of the right 0 mgress an 
egress to indicate that it embraces any su~h ~a.semen~ .. Th~ 
right of ingress and egress is a creation of JudICIal deCISIOn. 
lThe origin of the whole doctrine of abut~ers' rights. is graphicallYNdeo 
scribed in the ~issenting °9P~n~~ O~!\~~st[l:: ~.~~e;2~ ~9u~~~.v872j~ York and H. R. R. Co., 1, .. , , f lit 
"The plaintiff' 8 rights, whether expressed in terms of property or 0 co 
, ' 
, , 
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(See Orane v. Hahlo 258 US 142 4 
514].) lUi operation' as a Ih~it t'[ 2 S.Ct. ~14, 66 L.Ed. 
by municipalities and public tl~~n on .st;eet Improvements 
York elevated railway UIII les orlgmated in the New 
cases. n th 1 d' 
v. New York Elevated Railw 0 e ea mg case of Story 
146], an injunction was sou ~ 0.,90 N:Y. 122 [43 Am.Rep. 
elevated railway in the t g tt to res~raIn the erection of an 
b s ree on WhICh l' 'ff' a utted. The court held th t th p amtl s property 
vated railway purposes wa ~ e .use of the street for ele· 
right of way for street s mconslstent ~ith the use of the 
the land originally;laid !~~:S:~~eeThe Clty had subdivided 
the land by deeds conta' . ts and lots, and conveyed 
on the maps should formmg a co~enant that the streets shown 
ever remam open bl' 
ways. The court cited the d' as pu IC streets and 
. or mary rule th t 
mg a conveyance that f a a grantor mak· 
. reersto a map h' ' 
not dIvert the lands to an . s owmg streets can· y use mconsist t . h 
uses of the street Th en Wit the normal 
th ., . e court held that thO e Clty In its role as subd' 'd 18 rule applied to 
El t d' ' lVI er. In Lah M . eva e Ratlway 00. 104 NY 26 r v. etropolttan 
the court held that e~en h" 8 [10 N.E. 528], however 
their title from the city aW de~e the abutters did not deriv; 
as existed in the Story case nth ad no express covenant, such 
of access to the street Th e~ n.evertheless had an easement 
under the New York statut~ w~18 of the decision was that 
trust was created for the benefit o;~~y stre.ets were opened a 
for the benefit of abutt' e pubbc at large and also 
, mg owners. The t ' 
easement of access was I'm l' 't . cour held that an 
. t t k P lCl m the ttL 1 ~o care to hold that the abuttin rus " ~ter, however, 
ordmate to any reasonabl g owner s rIghts are sub· 
e use of the street made by public 
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authorities to facilitate general travel. (Reining~. New .Y ork 
L. &- W. R. 00., 128 N.Y. 157 [28 N.E. ,640,,14, L.R-A., 133] ; 
Rigney v. New York O. &- H. 00" 217 N.Y., 31, [111 N."FJ; 
226].) Presumably the public right to us~.}h~e: 'street; was 
reserved if the city subdivided and sold thelot,s ,l:pt~~ street; 
conversely compensation for the normal uses Ot th,~ str~~t,:~as 
paid if the street or highway was condemned 'or conveyed. 
(See Davis v. Oottnty Oommissioners, 153 Mass. 218" (26 N.E. 
848, 850, 11 L.R.A., 750); 13 Va.L.Rev. 334.)~ile the 
normal uses of the street are bound to change with the times, 
the streets are invariably characterized as publi~ rights of 
WQ. ,,' : 
In Eachus v. Los Angeles Railway 00., 103 Cal,. 614 [37 P. 
750, 42 Am.St.Rep. 149), upon which plaintUf reli,es heavily, 
the city had likewise subdivided and sold the, property owned 
by 'the plaintiffs. California, like New York, later extended 
abutters' easements to cases where title was not derived from 
the city. The trust that arises from the appropriation of land for 
public thoroughfares is for the benefit of the, public at large 
and only incidentally for the benefit of abutting owners. The 
extension of the abutting owner's rights in the present case 
makes th~ primary consideration the bene:fj.t of ahutting own· 
ers rather than the benefit of the public. Hith~rto no, Cali-
fornia case has ever defined the right of ingress or egress as 
inclusive of an easement to the next intersecting street. The 
rule has been that the right of ingress and egress is limited 
to adequate and reasonable access to the property from the 
street, that it does not extend to the full width of the street, 
or to the full length thereof, or even to all points upon the 
street in front of the abutting property. It is sufficient if 
there is access to a street that in turn connects with the gen-, 
eral street system. Any improvement that does not materially 
interfere with such access does no cdmpte'nsable damage. The 
California Vehicle Code and city traffic ordinances abound 
with regulations that limit a property owner's freedom of 
movement upon the street on which his propertyabuts.ThWi 
"U" turns or the making of left turns upon emerging from 
a building or private driveway are frequently prohibited, and 
the diversion of traffic into one-way streets is common. Fre~ 
quently traffic moving in opposite directions is separated by 
some physical barrier such as a raised curbing. The~e re-
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strictions have the same effect whether they ensue from traf-
fic regulations or physical obstructions and there is no more 
reason to allow compensation because of the resulting diminu-
tion in property values or the inconvenience of circuity of 
travel in the one case than in the other. 
The newly created property right in this case is inconsis-
tent not only with the trust from which the right of ingress 
and egress is derived, but with the established rule in this 
state and others that street improvements give rise to no com-
pensable damage if there is no injury to the abutting owner 
different in kind from that suffered by other property owners 
and the general public. This rule is repudiated in the ma-
jority opinion: "If he has a property right and it has been 
impaired, the damage is necessarily peculiar to himself and is 
different in kind than that suffered by him as a member of 
the public generally for his particular right as a property 
owner and not as a member of the pUblic has been damaged." 
This statement draws its conclusion from an assumption of the 
very thing to be proved. The question is whether or not the 
owner has a property right that has been impaired, and it 
cannot be assumed that he has without drawing a line behveen 
his property and all the other property in the community. 
When the majority opinion draws the line at the next inter-
section it arbitrarily attaches a right to abutting property in 
one block on the street, but not to abutting property on the 
same street in the next block Or to property abutting on 
neighboring streets, even thougb they may likewise be dimin-
ished in value as a result of the improvement and the Owners 
may be similarly inconvenienced by circuity of travel. Re-
covery therefore depends upon the accident of location.1 
Whatever difficulties may arise in applying the rule requir-
lThe concurring opinion attempts to draw a distinction bet.ween abut~ 
ting Owners in the block on which the obstruction exists and other owners, 
on the ground that "All vehicles entering the block must either turn 
around or back out in order to leave it. " This inconvenience is not essen-
tially different from the inconvenience of circuity of travel, and it is not 
compensable for the very reasons advanced in the concurring opinion 
with regard to circuity of travel. (See also Jones Beach BlYUle'IJard Es-
tates v. MOBeB, 268 N.Y. 362 (197 N.E. 313, 100 A.L.R. 487]; 'Ralph v. 
Hasen, 68 App.D.C. 55 [93 F.2d 68, 71]; City of }f'ort Smith v. Van Zandt, 
197 Ark. 91 [122 S.W.2d 187].) It is commonplace in the operation of 
motor vehicles to turn around on streets or back out therefrom just as it 
is to back out from property where there is no space for turning the 
vehicles. The right of ingress and egress is no more impaired in such 
situations than on a one-way street or divided highway where oue cannot turn around or back out, 
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• 0 the facts of a particular case ing proof of sp~Clal dama~~at 71 N.H. 41 [51 A. 635, 636, 57 
(see Cram v. O~ty of Laco. t- tandard that has become a 
L.R.A. 282]), it is an obJec ~:e sIt should not be abandoned 
rule of property over the yea ·b. t· e J'udgment of a major-
1 d b the su Jec IV . 
merely to be rep ace ! . ticular owners for com-
ity of this court that smgle~ o.ut t~ar m' the value of their 
. f the dImmu IOn 
pensatIOn because. 0 • of circuity of travel. . .' 
property and the mconv~menc~hat an injury is, not. peculIar 
It has long been establIshed I b e the 'itnprovement 
. t mere y ecaus . 
to the abuttmg proper y I f the property. (Eachus v.' 
. . t· in the va ue 0 2 A 
causes a dImmu IOn Cal 614, 617 [37 P. 750, 4 ~. 
Los Angeles Ry. 00., 103. f efully stated by Mr. ChIef 
St.Rep. 149].) The. rule IS orc uinn287 U.S~ 315, 319, 
Justice Stone in Rewhelderfer AV'L ~ 1429]: "But the exist. . 
[53 S.C. 177, 77 L.Ed. 331, ~3 e~e~ate interests protected by 
ence of value alone does r;o . g t. by the government, ho.w-
.. inst dImInU Ion .. .. d the ConstitutIOn aga . a be The beneficIal ,use an 
ever unreasonable its actI~n my. ty IS decreased when a 
hence the value of a.buttmg P;o~b~ructedbY ,pUblic author-
public street or c~nails clos;~ ;.S. 82, 95; [19, S.Ot.106, 41 , 
ity, Meyer v. R~chm:ond, 1 York 96N.Y; 240;, Fox v. : 
L .. Ed: 199) ; cf. Wh~tne~ v·2:e~Ed.928h',Kirk;v. ,Maumee: O~nc~nnat~, 104 U.S. 78 'i 802 803 [49, S.Ct., 507; 73 L.Ed.;, 
Valley E .. 00., 279 U.S. 79 'ush~ M8.'!s.} 25:4:f Stanw,ood, "! . .';: 
963]; Smtih v. Boston, 7 C 702 (16 LR.A .. 591];f'or 8J street': 
Malden, 157 Mass. 17)31 N.E. h' ' t n· 20 How. (U.S.} 135:' 
grade is raised, Sm~th v. W ~o;:Z~:d/ 200:U.S. 14S,.162 '[2~:': 
[15 L.Ed. 858] ; see Mead] v. th locaiion of. a county 'seat, 
S.Ot. 171, 50 L.~~. 413 or \00U.8. 548 (25:L.Ed710~l::, 
N,ewton v. OommfSswners, supra [ L' 'isville &f'N. 1l;, Oo.;!' 
'1 d' hanged (Bryan v. ou .' .' .t"" 
or of a ral roa , IS C • 59]) But in such Case$Iio prlva ,ei., 157.C.C.A.98 [244 F. 650, 6 . . '~;;";; .. ,.,' 
right ~ infringed. .. . ndari~o':r:'the commoh'l'a:W:':: 
"Beyond the tradItIOnal. bou. . . policy will lead the ':, 
Only some imperative justificatIOn m erty' rightS ... , T. he! 
. . ld lues new prop , '., .. !! 
courts to recognIze In 0 vat. .s not of private rights alone,; h the ques IOn I .'.' 'd t'.' case is clear were 'd d' 'nished as an mel en" 
but the value was both created an nt Im~or if the enjoymerit:,: 
of the operations of. the gover~~e. ~blic actS of govern~ent" ~ 
of a benefit thus derIve~ ;[0t::.s to ~ave it perpetuate~, th,~',f 
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In holding that owners of land . . 
had no easement in the park adJacent to 11 pUblic park 
covery because of th . and therefore no claim to 
e erectIOn of fi' re-pa~k that reduced the value a. lre-e~g'me house in the 
Chlef Justice Stone declared. ~~T~eIghbOrI~g property, Mr. 
complain; the damaO'e suffe . d b e abuttmg owner cannot 
d~gree than that of b the r ;e f y him 'though greater in 
kInd.''' (See also Ea k es 0 the pUblic, is the same in 
Cal. 6~4, 617 [37 P: 753 :~ ~;os Angeles etc. By. 00., 103 
0/ O~lifornia, 19 Ca1.2d 713 737 .~t.Rep. 149J ; Rose v. State 
v. Gtanni, 130 Cal.App. 584 58644 [123 P.2d 505J ; People 
St.Ockton v. Marengo 137 CIA' [20 P.2d 87J; Oity of 
Dut N . , a. pp 760 [31 P 2d 
. o. 9 v. F'armer 101 C 1 1'7 . 467] ; Levee 38~1') .. ' . a . 8 [35 P. 569, 23 L.R.A,. 
e applIcation in numero . 
requiring. Ii showing of s ec~ cases In this state of the rule ~~w that. If an obstructio~ cuts ~~ma:es has ~stablished the 
IS prenuses to the street h t e owner s access from ~~;j; Z;::k~ ~tai:sofA oailifoer!:~ ~~ff~a~~2; ;i~ci[ai2~n~ry2d' 
P 750 . nge es etc R 0 . 
. , 42 Am.St.Rep 149]. . y. 0., 103 Ca1. 614 [37 
geles, 214 Cal. 67 [4 P.2d 139rcfandless v. Oity of Los An-
00., 208 Cal. 29 [280 P 109 ' ~e v. San Diego Elec Ry 
Cal. 288 [lI6P. 750J; Willia;'; Wilcox v. Engebretson: 160 
Cal. 592 [89 P. 330] ; Geurkink s v. ~os Angeles Ry. Co., 150 
306 [44 P. 570] . B' 1 v. C~ty of Petaluma 112 C 1 
307]:) It has als~ eS~~~:heVd !allrino, 111 Ca1. 559 [44 ;. 
of CIrcuity of travel does not ell ~w that the inconvenienc~ 
A.L.R. 333; 93 A.L.R. 639) a~a or comp~nsation (see 49 
the owner after he is on the' t d that any mconvenience to 
t~e system of public streets ~ :ee1 and wishes to travel over 
WIth the ?,eneral public and does amage su~ered in common 
ment of hIS easement Thus . B' znot constItute an impair 
404, the defendant b'y th ,In ~g ey v. Nunan, 53 Cal 403-
h If ' e construct' f " o.ne,- a of the public street i .IOn 0 a fence, occupied 
tIff s property but on the 0 ~~edI~telY in front of plain-
fr.om. The fence shut off c;P SIte SIde of the street there-
WIdth in front of plaintiff' mpletely one-half of the street 
defendant to abate the nuiss property. The plaintiff sued the 
held that if there was a n:~:~ an~ for damages. The court 
that. a private person could ce ~ was a pUblic one and p~blIc nuisance unless he co ~~t brmg an action to ab~te a 
hIS property that was peculi':' t st~w dam~g~ to himself or 
o 1m as dIstInguished from 
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damage to the public. The court held thai' 'the plaintiff col1ld) 
not make such a showing under' the allegedfacts,"declEtrihg:' 
"The access from plaintiff's lot to the street: has not been' 
cut off or impeded, and if plaintiff and his' ilI1lnediate'neigh~1 
bors have more occasion to pass through' 'the street; than the' 
public at large, this is an inconvenience' in degree: only, and 
is not an injury in kind different from thatsustained':bythtl' 
public. " The narrowing of a' street by' one"11alf immediatelY: 
opposite a lot, is in principle no different: fromtner clbsitlg: 
of .the street in one direction with access'left.unimpeded in' 
the other. . ; . ,.,t' , . 'i 
In Reynolds v. Presidio etc. R. R.Oo., 1 Cal.Ap·p;;229 [81 
P.1118]; the complaint alleged that the layingof..streetcar 
tracks near the boundary of plaintiff's;propeity~;has:,".'ob~ 
structed. ingress to and from said property!' 'Indenying 
damages the court said: "There is no allegation that the ·ob~. 
struction prevents the plaintiff from having access ;to,and 
from her property. . .. Such obstruction clearly would not. 
prevent the plaintiff from getting on or off her lot to the 
public street." 
Where; however, the obstruction cuts off access to the 
street an injury results that is peculiar to the property and 
different in kind from that suffered by the general public. 
The distinction is forcefully brought out in Hargro v. Hodg-
don, 89 Cal. 623, 628 [26 P. 1106]. In that case th~ defendant 
constructed on a public alleyway a building that occupied 
the whole alley along the plaintiff's property line. The court 
affirmed an order enjoining the maintenance of the. building. 
After approving the doctrine that. the obstruction of a pub-
lic highway of itself. does not constitute a specif\.l in.jury. t~ 
an abutting property owner, the court stated:, ','But it has 
never been held that an individual cannot,maini~iA!anact.ip~ 
to abate an obstruction which, while opstructing,.tli.e"publi~· 
highway, also cuts off access from his premises to th~\Publi~ 
highway. So far as it does this, it becomes a private nuisance. 
His complaint is, not that it obstructs the street or road, bu,t 
that it prevents him from reaching it." (See, also, Sohau/eZe 
v. Doyle, 86 Cal. 107 [24 P. 834] ; Strong v. Sullivan, 180 Cal. 
331 [181 P. 59, 4 A.L.R. 343] ; Williams v. Los Angeles Ry. 
Co., 150 Cal. 592, 594 [89 P. 330].) 
In Hitch v. Scholle, 180 Cal. 467 [181 P. 657], the com-
plaint alleged that the plaintiff owned certain land subject 
to an easement of way in the puhlli: and that the defendant 
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obstructed this public highway by building and maintaining 
a fence acros~ it an? .thre~tened to plow up the highway. 
The ~ourt demed an InJunctIOn, declaring: "It is well settled 
th~t If ~n obstruction which is wrongfully erected and main-
~aI~ed In a public highway constitutes a nuisance which in-
JurIOusl~ affects a private person equally in common with 
the pubhc at large, a private action may not be maintained 
~o abate the nuisance. (Blanc v. Klumpke, 29 Cal. 156.) It 
~s ?nly where t~e free use of the property of a private person 
18. mte:fered w.Ith by such an obstruction that he may have 
hIS prIvate. actIOn to abate the nuisance reSUlting therefrom 
... there IS ~o gr.ound for an action by a private person to 
abat~ a ~ublIc nUIsance resulting from the obstruction of a 
pubhc hIghw.ay where it merely appears that the person 
~ould be subJected to personal inconvenience by the obstruc-
tIOn or. pl~ced under the necessity of traveliug by a much 
more CIrCUItous route to reach his destination." (180 Cal. 
467, 468, 470; see, also, 2 Wood on Nuisances, 853, sec. 645; 
42 Co~umb. L. Rev. 5~6, 613; 4 Rest., Torts, 216 et seq.) 
WhIle t~ese are n~ll~ance cases they are directly in point, 
fo:an actIOn to enJOIn a public nuisance cannot be main-
~aIned u.nless it constitutes an injury to a private right. It 
IS establIshed that a property right must be invaded before 
co~pens~tion is . all~wed under article I, section 14 of the 
CalIfornla ConstItutIOn. The constitutional provision creates 
no property rights; it protects those that already exist. That 
~hIch was dar::num ab~que. injuria before the adoption of the 
or .d~maged clause IS stIll damnum absque injuria. "The 
pr~vIsIOn (art. I, sec. 14) permits an action against the state 
WhICh cannot be sued witho~t its consent. It is designed, not 
to create n~w causes of actIon, but to give a remedy for a 
cause of a~tlOn that would otherwise exist. The state is there-
fore not lIable under this provision for an inJ'ury that . db' . . I IS 
ammtm a sque ~nJur~a. f the property owner would have 
no cause of action were a private person to inflict the damage 
he can have no claim for compensation from the state ,: 
(Archer v. City of Los Angeles 19 Cal2d 19 24 [119 p' 
2d 1J.) ",.
The rule, ~owever, is not derived solely from ~he nuisance 
cases. Thus ill Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 124 Cal 274 
[57 P. 82J, th.e .San Francisco Board of Supervisors p~ssed 
an order prOVIding for the reduction in the width of Turk 
-----------------------~----- -~-
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Street from 100 feet to 68 feet 7 inches. The abutting owners 
claimed that the improvement could not be made without 
providing compensation for the damage the improvement 
would cause their property. In sustaining a demurrer to 
their petition for certiorari the court declared: "The prop-
erty which an abutting owner has in the street in front of 
his land is the right of access and of light and air, and for 
an infringement of these rights he is entitled to compensation. 
This right is peculiar and individual to the abutting owner, 
differing from the right of passing to and fro upon the 
street, which he enjoys in common with the public, and any 
infringement thereof gives him a right of action ... , The ap-
pellants herein do not, however, claim that the reduction in 
the width of the street will in any respect interfere with their 
enjoyment of light and air, or that access to their lots is in 
any degree impaired. Indeed, in view of the fact that by 
the proposed reduction of the street it will have the same 
width as the majority of streets in the city, such contention 
could not be made. . . . The damage which the appellants may 
sustain by reason of a diminution in value of their lands is 
not damage for which they are entitled to compensation .... 
'The right of abutting owners in the streets is not of that 
absolute character that they can resist or prevent any and 
all interference with the street to their detriment, or which 
can be asserted to stay the hand of the municipality in the 
control, regulation, or improvement of the streets in the pub-
lic interest, although it may be made to 'appear that the 
privileges which they had theretofore enjoyed; and the bene-
fits they derived from the street in its existing condition, 
would be curtailed or impaired to their .injUry·bythe changes 
proposed.' (Reining v. New York etc; 'Ry:' Ca.,. 128 i N.Y. 
157 [28 N.E. 640, 14 L.R.A. 133].)I~ 'has: been held-in 
other states that even the entire closing ora'street lipon' which 
property abuts does not give to the owner a right of'co~pen;. 
sation, so long as there are other public streets by' which he 
has acceSi! to his land. The mere inconvenience thereby eX-
perienced is not a damage for which he is' entitled to compen-
sation." (124 Cal. 274, 280.) , 
In McCandless v. City o/Los Angeles; 214-Cal. 67 [4 P.2d 
139], involving a claim for damages tinder article I, section 
14, recovery was allowed because the injurywas'regarded as 
peculiar to the abutting property. The court declared: 
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"Cases illustrating the rule that an abutting property owner 
may suffer special damages peculiar to himself and indepen. 
dent of such damage a.'3 he sustains in common with other 
property owners and the public by reason of the construction 
of railroad tracks in the street adjacent to his property are 
these: O'Connor v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co., 122 Cal. 681 
[55 P. 688] ; Smith v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co., 146 Cal. 164 
[79 P. 868, 106 Am.St.Rep. 17] ; Fairchild v. Oakland & Bay 
Shore Ry. Co., 176 Cal. 629 [169 P. 388J ; Lane v. San Diego 
Elec. Ry. Co., 208 Oal. 29 [280 P. 109]." (214 Cal. 67, 70, 
71.) In holding that the subway, approach and railings a,s 
constructed greatly" interfer,~d with the free use by the plain-
tiff of the street in front of her property for the purpose of 
ingress and egress" the court quoted from Brown v. Board of 
Supervisors, supra, as follows: "The property which an 
abutting owner has in the street in front of his land is the 
right of access and of light and air, and for an infringement 
of these rights he is entitled to compensation. This right is 
peculiar and individual to the abutting owner, differing from 
the right of passing to and fro upon the street which he en-
. , 
JOys in common with the public, /lnd any infringement thereof 
gives him a right of action." (See, also, Eachus v. Los An-
geles etc. Ry., 103 Cal. 614 [37 P. 750, 42 Am.St.Rep. 149J ; 
Lane v. San Diego Electric Ry. Co., 208 Cal. 29 [280 P. 109J ; 
Williams v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 592, 594 [89 
P: 330] ; Hargro v. Hodgdon, 89 Cal. 623 [26 P. 1106] ; Geur-
k~nk v. City of Petaluma, 112 Cal. 306 [44 P. 570J ; Rose v. 
State of California, 19 Cal.2J 713 [123 P.2d 505].) 
The identity of the tests in the nuisance case.q and actions 
for damages under article I, section 14, is forcefully brought 
out in Brown v. Rea, 150 Cal. 171 [88 P. 713], in which the 
plaintiff sought to enjoin the construction of a railroad in a 
Rtreet. In sustaining a demurrer to the complaint the court 
declared: "Generally speaking, a pUblic nuisance does not 
furnish ground for action by a private person, but such pub-
lic nuisance may inflict upon an individual such peculiar in-
jury as to entitle him to maintain a separate action for its 
abatem.ent? ?r to recover damages therefor .... The injury 
to the mdlvldual must, however, be different in kind and not 
merely in degree from that suffered by the general pUblic. 
(Aram v. Schallenberger, 41 Cal. 449; Bigley v. Nunan, 53 
Cal. 403; Hogan v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 71 Cal. 83 [11 
Dec. 19431 BACICH V. BOARD OF CONTROL 
[23 C.2d 343] 
379 
P. 876].) Ordinarily, an obst~ction. to a h~ghwa!, .if ~­
authorized and illegal, is a pnbhc nmsance. "The lllJUry 18 
to the right to travel upon the highway, ,which right resides 
in the public generally. Suchobsti"uctionptay,however, 
constitute a private nuisance as well. Evert,owner ~fland 
abutting upon a highway has ~ right of a?,cessfrom ~~sl~d: 
to the highway and from thc,hIghway to b~ land." .rrh~s rIght 
of access is an easement, and an obstructIon ,to the, ,hIghway 
which at the same time obstructs ihis easem~nt is a.. p~?,uliar 
injury to the abutting landowner and gives him' a (lause, Df 
action." Holding that the cDmplaint ~as' insufficient because 
it did nDt allege that the "right Df passage b~twe~n::t~?,str~et 
and his premises" was impaired, the court decla:r:~(l= ; .Th~se, 
facts alDne do nDt make it appear to th? co~rt:,thl;\~:~e)I~~7, 
tiff's right of passage between the.streetan?hI~: pre~e~: 
will be in any degree affected." Tlie C,Durt later. ~til.ted: 
"We do. not overlook the consideration that,under t~e cDn-. 
stitutiDnal prDvision that 'private prDperty shall n~t beta~en 
or damaged for public use withDut just cDmp'~nsat~oIl havmg 
first been made' ... damages may.be recDvered by an abut-
ting owner fDr any public use of a street whichdamage8 his 
adjDining property or his easement of access· to ~d from the 
street . . . But the cDmplaint, whether seeking damageS after 
the construction Dr an injunction before, must· show SDme 
actual Dr threat~ned injury to' a private property right Df 
the plaintiff, and this the present complaint. fails to' do." 
(150 Cal. 171, 174, 175; see, also., Wolf! v. C'tty of Los An-
geles, 49 Cal.App. 400 [193 P. 862]; City of San Mateo v. 
R~'lroad Commission, 9 Cal.2d 1 [68 P.2d 713].) 
Under the majDrity opinion new private property rights 
representing millions Df dollars have. been carved out of pub-
lic streets and highways, at the expense nDt alDne of the pub-
lic treasury but of the public safety. Of recent years the 
grDwth Df traffic has necessitated the cDnstructiDn of high-
ways with fewer intersecting streets to. expedite the flDw of 
traffic and reduce the rate Df mDtor vehicle accidents. Such 
highways have been constructed thrDugh the city Df San 
Rafael, and the Arroyo. SecD Parkway from Los Angeles to. 
Pasadena, and the cDnstruction Df many mDre is cDntemplated. 
In such cases it will be necessary either to close the cross 
streets or to carry them under or Dver the freeway, bDth costly 
prDjects. The plans cDntemplate Dverhead or subway cross-
. j 
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ings every few blocks ~ver the freeway, necessarily creating 
cul-~e-sacs of .the remaIning streets. Similar improvements 
a~e Involved In the separation of grades of railroads and 
hIghways, for it is usually necessary to make a dead end of 
one or .more streets as a highway is raised or lowered to cross 
the ~aIlroad tracks. In the present case the cul-de-sac on 
SterlIng Street was .an integral part of the rearrangement of 
the streets o~ the CIty of. San Francisco made necessary by 
the constructIon of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay B 'd Th t f k' rI ge. 
e cos 0 ~a Ing such improvements may be prohibitive ~ow that new rIghts are created for owners of property abut-
tIng on streets that would be at right angles to the improve-
ments, for these rights must be condemned or ways con-
str~lCted over or .under the improvements. The construction 
of Im~rovements IS bound to be discouraged by the multitude 
of claIms th~t. would arise, the costs of negotiation with claim-
ants or of lItIgation, and the amounts that claimants might 
recover. Such claims could only be met by public revenues 
that ~ould otherwise be expended on the further development 
ant Improvement of streets and highways . 
. t . must be remembered that the question is not whether 
eXIstIng easements should be taken without compensation 
but whether private rights should be created for an arbitraril; 
chosen ~o~p ?f private persons, necessitating tribute from 
the .publIc If It exercises public rights of long standing in 
the Interest of safe and expeditious travel on public thorough-
fares. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied January 
17,1944. Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing. 
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ADDIE LILLIAN BEALS, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF 
LOS ANGELES et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Streets-Ownership-Rights of Abutter-Oompensation.-In 
an action for an injunction to restrain a city from closing a 
public alley, the fact that plaintiff's property is a corner lot, 
abutting on two streets in addition to the alley, and that there 
is a possibility of access over these adjoining streets, is not 
ground for holding that the plaintiff has no property right or 
easement in the alley or that it may be taken or damaged 
without payment of compensation. (Expressly ,disapproving" 
language to the contrary in Hitch v. Scholle, 180 Cal. 467, 
469 [181 P. 657].) . 
[2] Id.-Vacation-Oonclusiveness of Determination.-The act of 
a city council in ordering the vacation of a street is legislativo 
in character and is conclusive both as to the necessity and 
convenience of the improvement and as to the extent of the 
district to be benefited thereby. 
[3] ld.-Vacation-Oonclusiveness of Determination-Fraud.-
The finality of the act of .a city council in ordering the vaca-
tion of a street is subject to an exception where the finding 
of public convenience and necessity results from fraud or 
collusion between the council and the private landowners. 
[4] ld.-Street Opening Acts-Act of 1889,-Pleading-Fraud.-
In an injunction proceeding to restrain the city of Los Ange-
les from closing a public alley, a complaint alleging that the 
vacation of the alley was sought solely by the city Depart-
ment of Water and Power on the ground, among others, that 
a valuable property right of the department might be util-
ized thereby and particularly that permanent buildings might 
be erected on the land; that the department is the owner of 
all lands abutting the portion of the alley to be closed, with 
the result that it will acquire title to the land abandoned; 
and that the proposed vacation is solely for the benefit of 
the department, is not sufficient to show fraud or collusion. 
[5] ld.-Street Opening Acts-Act of 1889-0ommissioners.-
[2] See 19 OaI.Jur.33; 25 Am.Jur. 418. 
[5], See 19 Oal.Jur. 204. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Streets, § 33; [2, 3] Streets, § 18; . 
[4] St:reetst § 219; [5] Streets, § 211; [6] Eminent Domain, § 199; 
[7] Eminent Domain, § 43; [8,9] Emi,nent Domain, §196; [10] 
Eminent Domain, § 43(1). 
